BPA: MURDER COVER-UP?

 

BPA: MURDER COVER-UP?

British Parachute Association Ltd, trading since December 2019 as British Skydiving, narrowly escaped prosecution for corporate manslaughter over the death of John Ward in 1991. 

When Army Officier Cadet and keen skydiver Stephen Hilder fell to his death in July 2003 after a person or persons unknown cut through the risers of his main and reserve canopies and the bridle of his drogue parachute, Humberside Police launched a murder investigation.

Officer Cadet Stephen Hilder: a bright future

One of BPA Ltd's two National Coach and Safety Officers, Tony Butler, told the coroner's inquest into Hilder's death in March 2005: "I have investigated sixty deaths in the UK. The majority of these deaths were caused by collisions or by deploying the parachute too low. Never in all my years have I come across any incident like this.". 

Testifying as a parachuting accident investigator, Butler told the inquest into Hilder's death that the BPA inquiry had been working on the assumption that Hilder's death was murder. 

According to former BPA directors and council members, Stephen Hilder was seen as the driving force behind an initiative on the part of younger members to seek election to the BPA Council, take control and impose changes.

These changes would have included a more serious attitude to safety and greater safety-related spending by the BPA, whose published accounts declare a risible annual expenditure of £5,000 or less of the firm's millions. After Hilder's death. this initiative fizzled out and it was business as usual at BPA Ltd. 

Meanwhile, the annual death and injury toll through 'normal' accidents continued to rise as the BPA, aided and abetted by the CAA, continued its tenacious evasion of its legal obligations under The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and other legislation.

Tony Butler: sixty skydiving fatalities

Ten months into their murder investigation, during which Hilder's two friends and fellow skydivers were arrested, Humberside Police had suddenly changed tack, claiming that Hilder had committed suicide by cutting through his risers with a household scissors taken from the boot of his car by the police evidence gatherers. 

To support their assertion, the police said that the only DNA found on the scissors came from the dead man and that fibres from the severed risers were found on the scissors and on Hilder's jumpsuit.

Forensic scientist Peter Grant told the inquest that someone wearing gloves that left no DNA traces could have used the scissors. As for the fibres, Grant remarked that they could have been transferred to Hilder's jumpsuit as Hilder put his parachute on before his fatal jump. Grant also said: "I cannot exclude the possibility that someone else cut the straps.". 

Tests commissioned by the police on a replica of Hilder's skydiving rig found that the only tool capable of cutting easily through the risers was a double-bladed hook knife of a type carried by highly experienced skydivers specialising in canopy-stacking or formation displays. These tests were not discussed during the official inquest in 2005 or the British Parachute Association's internal inquiry.  

The investigating detectives had initially reported that Hilder's risers had been cut with "a hook knife". Ten months into the murder investigation, Humberside Police suddenly changed tack, stating that Hilder had cut his own risers with a pair of six-inch scissors found in the boot of his car. In other words, the police had concluded that Hilder's death was suicide.

Detective Superintendent Colin Andrews of the Humberside CID, who had been put in charge of the Hilder case, told the inquest that he did not believe that Hilder was murdered but added that he "might be wrong about that". To support their sudden contention that Hilder had taken his own life, D/Supt Andrews and his team suggested a number of possible motives. 

Hilder was said to be depressed because he believed that he had failed his annual exams at the Royal Military College of Science. After his death, it transpired that he had passed his exams. Police also cited the end of Hilder's relationship with his girlfriend Ruth W––––, who held a Master's degree in forensic engineering and science. Police said that Hilder had debt of £17,000, most of which involved the purchase of skydiving equipment.

Hilder is not known to have possessed a hook knife and police reports made no mention of any knife found with his equipment or his effects. D/Supt Andrews had told the inquest that his officers had searched for knives in the parachute storeroom after being told that it was likely that a knife, rather than scissors, had been used on Hilder's risers. 

As any skydiving specialist could have told the inquest, the household scissors found in the boot of Hilder's car could not have cut through risers made of double-thickness nylon webbing designed to support a 1,000 kilogram loading.

Tony Butler also told the inquest: "Anyone wanting to commit suicide would not go through all the drills that Stephen Hilder carried out.". Replying to Butler, North Lincolnshire Coroner Stewart Atkinson, in an apparent reference to the suicide theory advanced by the police, remarked: "Not unless you wanted it to look like murder.". 

Of the suggestion that Hilder had cut his own risers with the scissors, Hilder's girlfriend Ruth W–––– said: "If he was going to stage [his own death], then he wouldn't just chuck the scissors in the back of the boot.". 

She and Hilder had been in a "light-hearted, relaxed relationship for around five months", said Miss W––––, contradicting police assertions about romantic problems in Hilder's life. Asked by Stewart Atkinson if she believed that Hilder had committed suicide, Miss W–––– replied: "There is no way, there is just no way!".

Paul Hollow, the BPA-rated Chief Club Instructor running the programme at Hibaldstow that day, told the inquest: "[Hilder] pulled every handle available to him. I believe that he made every effort to save himself.".    

Hilder was just twenty years old when he fell to his death in a cornfield near Hibaldstow airfield in northern Lincolnshire on July 4th 2003. Hilder had exited the aircraft at 13,000 feet with Adrian B––– and David M––– a fellow army officer cadet at the Royal Military College of Science in Shrivenham, Wiltshire. The three skydivers belonged to the Black Rain skydiving team.  

M–––– said afterwards: "[Hilder] seemed excited when we were doing the last jump. He was like that the whole way down. In formation skydiving you want to make eye contact. Just making eye contact he seemed as happy as all of us. The jump hadn't started well but then we got things right and we were performing really well.". 

The three skydivers performed various manoeuvres together before separating at 4,000 and opening their parachutes. Neither Hilder's main nor reserve parachutes opened. Hilder's risers –– the double thickness nylon webbing straps to which the rigging lines of each parachute were attached –– and the bridle of his drogue parachute were found to have been cleanly cut through. 

Stephen Hilder's equipment had been sabotaged yet Coroner Stewart Atkinson recorded an Open Verdict. Atkinson said that there was no proof that Hilder had been murdered but that he remained unpersuaded that Hilder had committed suicide. Atkinson's verdict struck many observers as incomprehensible. Given the deliberate sabotage of Hilder's skydiving rig, how could a coroner rule out murder or suicide?  

Atkinson was unequivocal regarding his rejection of the police suicide theory. Before he announced his  Oper Verdict, Atkinson said: "There were a number of issues in [Hilder's] life but that does not persuade me that he killed himself.". Some observers wondered if Atkinson had been pressured by Humberside Police into ruling out murder as the cause of death.

Humberside Police had arrested David M–––– on suspicion of murder. Adrian B–––– was also arrested as an accessory and also on suspicion of making a snuff movie because he had videoed the jump. In fairness to Humberside Police, M–––– had not done himself any favours by composing a humorous draft obituary about Hilder, which police found on his computer. M–––– later said: "I think, after the hassle it has caused, I would prefer not to have written it.".

M–––– had also testified to the inquest about pranks he and other members of the team played on Hilder. A fortnight before Hilder's death, M–––– and another team member had removed a retaining pin from Hilder's parachute rig. 

M–––– told the inquest: "I assumed that he would have seen what had been done straight away. It was a way of highlighting that his kit had been left in a completely unsafe area. What we did meant he would have to unpack and repack his kit which would take him about fifteen minutes.". M–––– also said that he and B***** found Hilder annoying because he followed the British Parachute Association's safety manual to the letter. M–––– said: "Stephen was very safety-conscious.".  

Paul Hilder, father of Stephen Hilder, told the BBC and other media: "Stephen's life has been dissected and examined in great detail and we still do not know why he died. We do not know why anyone would want to kill him, nor is there evidence that he took his own life.". 

One of the CID detectives on D/Supt Andrews' team commented anonymously to a Yorkshire Post reporter: "Nothing we have discovered during the investigation and no-one we have interviewed has said anything to suggest Stephen may have been contemplating killing himself.". So, not all of the police detectives involved in the murder investigation agreed with the improbable suicide theory. 

D/Supt Andrews: witness intimidation

Investigated a few years later by his own force's anti-corruption unit and then by anti-corruption officers from Durham Constabulary, Colin Andrews was prosecuted and jailed for twelve months in 2015 for harassment, aggravated stalking, common assault and witness intimidation. Andrews was, however, cleared of rape.

Andrews had forced his attentions on two women despite their objections, citing his rank and power when telling them that nobody would believe their word against his. Manchester Crown Court heard that the thirty-year police veteran had "sociopathic tendencies" and was "a controlling, manipulative bully.".

Former Detective Chief Inspector Mark Oliver told the court "Officers were concerned about the dirt Mr Andrews would raise if he was prosecuted. Chief Superintendent Heaton was worried about the reputation of Humberside Police and worried specifically about salacious details that Colin Andrews knew and whether they would be used as mud-slinging to defend himself.".

Whilst the question of murder or suicide was examined, nobody raised the question of negligence in the failure to impose basic safety checks on Hilder and his equipment before he emplaned. At no time during his testimony did BPA Ltd's National Safety Officer Tony Butler or any other experienced skydiver challenge the police contention that Hilder was able to cut through his four risers with the scissors. 

One former BPA Ltd director and councillor of twenty-seven years' standing told BPA Watch: "The BPA has evaded negligence lawsuits and corporate manslaughter charges over and over again through dirty deals, out of court settlements and non-disclosure agreements. 

"CAA senior management don't want to rock the boat because of the history fatalities, accidents and cover-ups like the Stephen Hilder case. And the John Ward case in 1991. The BPA has evaded negligence lawsuits and corporate manslaughter charges over and over again through dirty deals, out of court settlements and non-disclosure agreements.".

BPA Watch asked Tony Butler –– now BPA Ltd's Chief Operations Officer –– if the suicide theory advanced by Humberside Police suited BPA because it placed the blame squarely on Hilder, thereby reducing the possibility being sued by Hilder's family. As in other cases, Butler did not respond. 

Butler has spoken of his involvement in investigating sixty skydiving-related fatalities since 1982. Like Butler himself during his testimony to the Stephen Hilder inquest, experienced BPA skydivers and instructors attribute most of these fatalities to bad canopy handling skills, which they attribute in turn to the lack of suitable training and retraining courses. 

BPA: Murder cover-up?

In an unrelated discussion with BPA Watch, a prominent Parachute Training Organisation operator who has clashed with BPA Ltd's directorate in the past over the Association's troubling safety record said: "The BPA spends shockingly little on safety and safety training every year. Just look at the annual returns. There should be far more emphasis on training and annual retraining of BPA instructors and examiners.". 

In 2018-2019, BPA Ltd spent £208,975 on "operating costs" in addition to £333,449 on "staff costs", which include the six-figure salary reportedly paid to Butler who is widely seen as BPA Ltd's ghost CEO. Conversely, BPA Ltd spent £2,129 on "safety". A further £1,395 was spent on "manuals, safety information and badges".  

An experienced BPA-rated parachute instructor, who asked to remain anonymous to protect his BPA ratings, told BPA Watch: "Steve Hilder allegedly cut his pilot chute bridle with a pair of cheap-o scissors, both of his reserve parachute risers, and steering toggles and Velcro in one go, some quite heavy-duty webbing, tucked everything into his rig and proceeded to jump in a 3-way competition. 

"Observers state it was the best jump the team had completed, with the descent captured on video. The cameraman was arrested for making a snuff movie but these charges were later dropped. One thing is sure, though: if Steve and his kit had been properly checked outside and inside the aircraft, he would not have died that day.". The inquest into Hilder's death was told that Hilder refused to let anyone check his equipment. 

On its website, BPA Ltd trading as British Skydiving confirms that it "controls all aspects of skydiving on behalf of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).". One former BPA Council member said: "The business relationship between the BPA and the CAA is run behind closed doors by Tony Butler and the CAA's Gordon Duncan. It's been that for years. Duncan signs off on anything Butler puts in front of him. And Duncan is protected by his bosses.  

CAA manager George Duncan: BPA poodle?

"The BPA is allergic to Health and Safety regulations and Butler has openly said that they want no dealings with the Health and Safety Executive. The CAA management from the top down knows this because they've been warned about it but they do nothing. They're complicit. Just read the latest CAP660 from March this year: where's the Health and Safety stuff you find in other CAPs? ". 

Why was the murder investigation dropped? Were there two many potential suspects? Did the police realise that they had failed to observe basic crime scene procedures when they arrived at Hibaldstow? Or was there a cover-up to protect someone and, if so, who was covering up for whom? 

Whether ex-Detective Superintendent Andrews was ordered to quash the murder investigation or did so on his own initiative may never be known but it seems clear that someone wanted Hilder's murder written off as suicide. None of Hilder's relations or friends objected openly to the strangely-worded open verdict rendered by a coroner who seemingly came under pressure to validate the suicide theory. Is it possible that they were subjected to intimidation by Andrews?  

Why did the British Parachute Association fail to object to the fantastic police assertion that young Stephen Hilder cut through four 1,000 kg nylon risers with a set of household scissors? Did D/Supt Andrews have  "dirt" any of the BPA directors and, if so, what kind of dirt?

Coroner Stewart Atkinson said that Hilder's death was neither murder nor suicide and had the cheek to tell Hilder's family that he hoped his open verdict would bring them peace and closure. But someone cut Hilder's parachute straps that weekend. Perhaps Hilder was not the intended target but if it was not suicide, then it must have been murder, even if Hilder might not have been the target. 

Don Canard

BPA-CAA: A LETHAL MIX

BPA-CAA: A LETHAL MIX

Since the Civil Aviation Authority delegated regulatory oversight to British Parachute Association Ltd –– rebranded and trading as British Skydiving in December 2019 –– in 1996, there have been forty-four known skydiving-related deaths and innumerable life-changing injuries. Do the quangocrats of the CAA care about their proxy regulator's shocking safety record? It seems not.

Before BPA Watch began asking questions about delegation of regulatory oversight by the CAA to BPA Ltd, BPA Ltd's website boldly advertised its status as a regulator acting for the CAA. By what authority did the CAA, a quango rather than a governmental department, delegate these powers to the BPA? And did the CAA even possess these powers to begin with? 

BPA Ltd took their website offline on November 10th 2020 "for essential maintenance". When the website was switched back on, the wording had been revised to: "We regulate our sport under an Exposition with the Civil Aviation Authority.". Sources within BPA Ltd indicate that CAA Head Office demanded the revision in the face of growing public awareness of the CAA's inability to control its proxy regulator.

Judging by some of the documents BPA Watch has seen, the CAA quangocrats don't like it when anyone suggests that the CAA not only condones but actively aids and abets BPA Ltd's strategy of establishing a lucrative monopoly over sports parachuting in the United Kingdom. The denials come from the top down.

CAA Chair Air Marshall Sir Stephen Hillier DFC: in denial?

In fairness to the current CAA directorship and its new Chair, Air Marshall (Ret'd) Sir Stephen Hillier DFC, they inherited the CAA-BPA relationship although they are aware of the growing discontent amongst BPA members about the firm's dubious practices because they read BPA Watch's blog.

However, far from seeking to address any impropriety, the CAA doggedly defends its relationship with BPA Ltd. Furthermore, the CAA has blatantly codified the BPA monopoly in the March 2020 edition of its Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 660. 

CAP 660, which underwent a public consultation phase during which the CAA ignored suggestions and objections, obliges Parachute Training Organisations, pilots and instructors to work through BPA Ltd. CAP 660 also underlines BPA Ltd's well-known aversion to Health and Safety legislation and might even be illegal.

As BPA Watch has revealed, twenty-one of the twenty-nine BPA-affiliated PTOs are in open revolt against the BPA over the autocratic behaviour of the firm's ghost directors, who hide behind a managing council of official directors without any effective executive power. 

Since its incorporation in 1966, BPA Ltd has had 123 directors, equating to an attrition rate of two resignations or firings per year. 

The majority of departures over the past few years have involved directors who challenged the cabal of ghost directors who run BPA Ltd like a private fiefdom. The firm's Chief Operations Officer Tony Butler heads this cabal but has never been a director of BPA Ltd. 

The governing legislation –– Air Navigation Order 2016 Article 90 –– stipulates that: "The CAA must grant a parachuting permission if it is satisfied that the applicant is a fit person to hold the permission and is competent to conduct parachuting safely, having regard in particular to the applicant’s (a) previous conduct and experience; and (b) equipment, organisation, staffing and other arrangements.".  

Before granting such permission, the CAA must of course be satisfied that the club or team is operating according an Operations Manual that is acceptable to the CAA. This all seems perfectly reasonable in theory but, in practice, the only Operations Manual deemed acceptable by the CAA –– for sports and military-style parachuting –– is the BPA Operations Manual. 

The CAA further facilitates the BPA monopoly by referring all applications to BPA Ltd. If BPA Ltd does not approve an application, it is either declined by the CAA or subjected to a seemingly endless administrative process. Another of the CAA-BPA ploys to maintain the BPA monopoly involves CAA insistence upon upfront payment of exorbitant fees for this administrative process––which the CAA never itemises.  

The CAA has a responsibility to ensure that once they issue a ‘Permission to Parachute’, parachuting is carried out safely. The CAA does not have any in-house parachuting expertise and has therefore delegated this responsibility to the BPA as a CAA-Approved Organisation.

BPA COO Tony Butler: sociopathic megalomaniac?

 

In one rare case concerning a PTO operator who bypassed BPA Ltd and obtained Approved Person status from the CAA, the operator received a visit from two senior BPA figures –– named as Tony Butler and Tye Boughen –– who expressed their displeasure in blunt terms. 

Shortly afterwards, the CAA withdrew the PTO operator's AP status. Not long after this, according to the PTO operator, Tye Boughen telephoned him about a upcoming examination to earn the BPA-approved examiner rating and told him not to bother attending as he would not pass the exam.  

Until recently, as BPA Watch wrote, BPA Ltd's website claimed that CAA had delegated regulatory oversight to the BPA. There are also minutes of BPA Council meetings in which this claim appears. 

Under the heading Approval of Persons to Furnish Reports, CAP 660 states: "6.4 Under the terms of Article 268 of the ANO the CAA may approve a person as qualified to furnish reports to it and may accept such reports. This responsibility will normally be undertaken within the structure provided by a competent corporate body which has been recognised for that purpose by the CAA.

"Since 1996, British Parachute Association Limited (trading as British Skydiving from Dec 2019) has been the holder of an Exposition & CAA Schedule of Approval, which enables parachuting Permissions to be issued to British Skydiving Parachute Training Organisations and Display Teams, by the CAA, on the basis of recommendations made by British Skydiving.".

Senior CAA and BPA Ltd management declined to comment but the wording on BPA Ltd's website was recently changed and now states: "We regulate our sport under an Exposition with the Civil Aviation Authority.".

Other BPA documents also make similar statements; the BPA operates to an ‘Exposition and Civil Aviation Authority of Approval’. This is the instrument that defines the organisation and procedures acceptable to CAA and describes the responsibilities, control and inspection procedures by which the BPA assures compliance with the terms of CAA Approval.

Former paratrooper and Red Devils member Ian Marshall served as a BPA Ltd Director and Council member for twenty-seven years. Marshall says of the Exposition that "the BPA ghost directorate refuses to show it to directors and council members. What are they hiding?".  

A source close to the BPA Council suggested that this very recent revision was imposed upon the autocratic Mr Butler and his cronies by CAA directors worried about BPA Watch's revelations and the  growing refusal of BPA-affiliated Parachute Training Organisations to continue tolerating some have openly described as BPA extortion and fraud. 

Skydiving death toll on BPA watch: does the CAA care?

BPA Ltd does not seem to spend much time or money on the safety aspects of their regulatory activities, as the shocking toll of fatalities and life-changing injuries since 1996 indicates. In the financial year 2018-2019, BPA Ltd spent just over £2,100 on safety but reportedly paid its COO and other ghost directors six-figure salaries. 

Some say that BPA Ltd has abused its regulatory powers to drive competitors out of business and to establish its increasingly lucrative monopoly on parachuting with the assistance of the CAA. Some former BPA directors speak of direct relationship between BPA ghost supremo Tony Butler and long-serving CAA CEO Richard Moriarty, who has been described as enjoying BPA corporate hospitality, including tandem parachute descents.

CAA CEO Richard Moriarty.

 Another question that clearly causes unease in the CAA and BPA corridors of power concerns the regulatory powers apparently given by the CAA to the BPA.

As a barrister who who acted for an airfield and parachute drop zone owner remarked: "The CAA is just a quango. It would have needed ministerial authorisation to delegate this power to the BPA. 

"However, the more salient question hiding in plain sight doesn't concern a possible overstepping of its powers by the CAA but whether the CAA even had these powers to delegate in the first place. The Air Navigation Order 2016, for instance, suggests otherwise.".

The ANO 2016 as quoted above casts doubt on the CAA's jurisdiction over parachuting itself, stating unequivocally that parachuting falls under the Health and Safety Executive. Parachutists come under CAA regulations whilst abroad aircraft but once they exit and clear the aircraft, CAA authority ends 

Letter of the law: no CAA oversight over parachuting?

 

The pilot cannot permit parachutists to exit his aircraft unless he has a Parachuting Permission granted by the CAA. Critics of the tightly-knit relationship between the CAA and the BPA say that the CAA refuses such permissions if the BPA does not approve of them. In this way and others, the CAA facilitates the BPA monopoly on parachuting. 

BPA Ltd has been able to amass millions of pounds over the years despite its claimed not-for-profit amateur status because, say former BPA Ltd directors, the CAA has only charged the firm a fraction of the fees that ought to have been paid according to the CAA's own Scheme of Charges. Conservative estimates of the under-payments are in the region of £3 million.

Others say that the millions are related in part to the BPA's income from student skydiver or temporary membership fees. As BPA Watch revealed, BPA-affiliated PTOs have to pay BPA Ltd a fee for every provisional membership related to tandem skydiving. Tandem skydiving is a £20 million-plus per annum business. 

Based on published figures, BPA Watch had arrived at a figure of £1,124,600 per annum but the true income, say PTO rebels, is twice as much. Whatever the case, these figures are somewhat more than the £4,066 declared as income from temporary membership in BPA Ltd's most recently published Annual Statement.  

 

These temporary membership fees are in effect a fee imposed on the PTOs by the BPA in return for the BPA affiliation they need in order to have CAA permission to organise parachute courses and events. As BPA Watch revealed, the insurance BPS Ltd forces on members and temporary members seems to be worthless.

Some PTO operators and other critics of the BPA have described the insurance requirements as a scam amounting to extortion. Others say that the BPA substantially understates the income it receives from PTOs each year the levy imposed on PTO customers for temporary BPA membership. BPA claims that over half of this levy relates to insurance cover. 

For years, PTOs have tried to get the BPA to show them its insurance policies because the declared premiums are far higher than any estimates obtained from leading insurance brokers by PTO owners and operators. BPA Watch explored the question of BPA insurance in Protection Racket and Sidestepping the Law.

As the PTO Paper says: “BS has been in the position to set pricing without meeting too much resistance from stakeholders. This has resulted in a non-profit business where there is [sic] significant excess earnings. This may have led to poor focus on financial efficiency and less considered spending.”.

While CAA authorisations are, of course, essential for any form of flight in United Kingdom airspace, they could be provided at a fraction of the tariffs the CAA demands from applicants whilst apparently exonerating BPA Ltd from such tariffs.  

In any final analysis, the CAA could be said to be failing in its duty to British taxpayers to collect the appropriate fees from BPA Ltd. In this way, taxpayers could be said to be subsidising the cost of the shocking number of fatalities and life-changing injuries suffered by skydivers because of the failure of the regulator to regulate safety. 

BPA Ltd has been described as "allergic to Health and Safety legislation and regulations and the most recent edition of its CAP 660, published by the CAA in March 2020, seems decidedly light on Health and Safety compared to other Civil Aviation Publications. BPA Ltd has stated that CAP 660 "represents a Code of Practice that was, in the main, developed by the BPA itself.".  

The BPA is clearly attempting to establish a monopoly on parachuting in the UK and the CAA is clearly aiding and abetting the BPA in this goal. The CAA is arguably complicit in the forty-four known skydiving fatalities and the numerous life-changing injuries since 1996, when the quango delegated its alleged powers to BPA Ltd. 

The CAA denies the charge but condones its proxy's tenacious refusal to respect Health and Safety legisation and to invest more in safety. The denials come from the top down athough the CAA interface with the BPA is handled by a relatively junior manager. Before BPA Watch was set up, the CAA Chair and CEO could have claimed to have been badly briefed by their subordinates. This is no longer the case. 

Whatever the case of this sordid affair, BPA Ltd has a vested interest in protecting the profitability of its dubious regulatory power and the CAA has a vested interest in making sure that its involvement in facilitating an impressive range of criminal behaviour as revealed by BPA Watch, which is rapidly becoming general public knowledge.

BPA Watch –– 26.11.2020

BPA: SIDESTEPPING THE LAW?

SIDESTEPPING THE LAW

By Chartered Health and Safety Practitioner Mike Bravo

In his article Protection Racket, Don Canard examines the insurance cover that full and temporary members are obliged to pay British Parachute Association Ltd, trading as British Skydiving. 

The current primary legislation is The Insurance Act 2015, which provides no specific legal requirement for persons engaged in recreational parachuting activities to be insured. However, insurance cover is certainly to be recommended.

However, if you are engaged in this activity under some form of contractual arrangement, the requirement for insurance may form part of the terms and conditions. This does not extend, subsequent to case law, to compulsory purchase of a particular insurance policy. 

If, for example, you book a holiday or hire a car, you are not obligated to pay additional fees if you have made adequate alternative arrangements. You have a freedom of choice and are certainly not required to double-indemnify. 

This is laid out clearly in the Financial Conduct Authority Handbook (May 2020) –– Insurance: Conduct of Business.

Civil Aviation Publication 660, co-produced by BPA Ltd with the Civil Aviation Authority, is explicit on the question of insurance.

CAP 660 –– Parachuting

Insurance

2.20 The operator is responsible for ensuring that insurance cover adequately meets regulatory requirements. The operator should ensure that parachutists have adquate liability insurance for the intended type of parachuting activity. The requirement for aircraft insurance cover is contained within Articles 6 & 7 of Regulation (EC) No. 785/2004.

Thus, CAP 660 makes it clear that responsibility for ensuring that parachutists have adequate insurance is the responsibility of the Parachute Training Organisation (PTO) as this is where the contractual relationship with the parachutist exists.

However, the situation changes when parachuting is being conducted as a work activity by, for example, BPA-rated instructors and examiners, display teams and freelance or self-employed instructors or coaches working at a BPA-associated event. This also applies to parachute rigging and equipment hire service providers. 

Generally speaking, you are only required by law to have employers' liability insurance for people whom you employ under a contract of service or apprenticeship. 

Whether or not you need employers' liability insurance for someone who works for you depends on the terms of your contract with them –– Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969. 

In any profession or occupation, you will normally need insurance to protect your business and also your clients. For individuals or companies providing any form of training or consultancy, there are two supplementary forms of insurance that should be purchased in addition to any compulsory employers' liability cover: Public Liability Insurance and Professional Indemnity Insurance.

This is where matters become somewhat opaque with regard to BPA Ltd and the insurance cover that the firm obliges members and affiliated organisations to buy. 

As Don Canard notes, BPA Ltd's insurance does not cover persons at work –- employees –– but is restricted in effect to member-to-member situations, which is a potential conflict in its own right.  Now, let's take another look at CAP 660 and what it says about legislation like the Air Navigation Order and other regulations.

CAP 660 –– Parachuting

2.4 Nothing in CAP 600 is intended to conflict with the ANO or other legislation, which in case of doubt must be regarded as overriding.

3.12 The use of a Safety Management System (SMS) is mandatory for PTOs and Display Teams.

It is therefore recommended that they refer to CAP 795: SMS Guidance for Organisations and CAP 1059: SMS Guidance for small, non-complex organisations in order to fulfil this requirement. 

CAP 660 clearly recognises that persons are at work. In other words, they are consequently subject to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 –– which is therefore the primary governing legislation –– and its regulations, particularly the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. 

CAP 660's Safety Management System requirement is interesting as these are high-level risk-based safety documents and, in many cases, replacements for Safety Cases.

An SMS pertains to the Policy, Organisation and Arrangements as required under Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and would be considered in law as overriding any operations manual, particularly one written by an amateur sports organisation like the British Parachute Association. 

Don Canard's analysis of BPA Ltd's insurance cover suggests that it is worthless because it is written in such a way as to render difficult or impossible any claims by those forced by BPA Ltd to buy it. 

On top of that fact, it is not even necessary as the BPA-affiliated Parachute Training Organisations are required to ensure that their clients have their own insurance, as stipulated in CAP 660, written by BPA Ltd and published by the Civil Aviation Authority. 

If the recently-formed Parachute Training Organisation Association were to seek reimbursement or compensation from BPA Ltd for the BPA levy imposed on tandem skydiving fees charged by the PTOs over the years, it might bankrupt BPA Ltd.