BPA: EVADING HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION?

EVADING HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION?

By Chartered Health and Safety Practitioner 'Bravo Three Zero'

Previously, we looked at Civil Aviation Publication 660, co-produced by BPA Ltd and the CAA to govern parachuting, in the context of insurance. In this article, we shall examine CAP 660 in the context of Health and Safety legislation. 

Now, let's take another look at CAP 660.

CAP 660 –– Parachuting

2.4 Nothing in CAP 600 is intended to conflict with the ANO or other legislation, which in case of doubt must be regarded as overriding.

3.12 The use of a Safety Management System (SMS) is mandatory for PTOs and Display Teams.

It is therefore recommended that they refer to CAP 795: SMS Guidance for Organisations and CAP 1059: SMS Guidance for small, non-complex organisations in order to fulfil this requirement. 

CAP 660: Mooning the Law?

CAP 660 clearly recognises that persons are at work. In other words, they are consequently subject to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 –– which is therefore the primary governing legislation –– and its regulations, particularly the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. 

CAP 660's Safety Management System requirement is interesting as these are high-level risk-based safety documents and, in many cases, replacements for Safety Cases.

An SMS pertains to the Policy, Organisation and Arrangements as required under Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and would be considered in law as overriding any operations manual, particularly one written by an amateur sports organisation like the British Parachute Association.

Various BPA Council Members and PTO operators have publicly stated that BPA Ltd senior management, particularly the Chief Operations Officer Tony Butler, have on numerous occasions stated that they do not want any HSE involvement in skydiving.

How would BPA Ltd sidestep Health and Safety regulations pertaining to parachuting? First of all, it is necessary to read this text: 

 

Appendix: Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority) Regulations 1998: A-Z guide to allocation schedule

Parachuting

A demarcation of responsibility has been agreed between the HSE and the CAA for the safety of non-employees, including the public, involved or affected by parachuting.

Serious or fatal incidents/accidents are subject to a British Parachute Association Board of Enquiry who report to the CAA. OC801/2 and Supplement provide further guidance. Incidents/complaints referred to the LA should be discussed with the ELO in the first instance.

MOD parachuting

This Supplement to OC 801/2 outlines the approach which should be adopted in relation to parachuting undertaken by MOD. The arrangements are different from those detailed in OC 801/2.

1. As a general rule parachuting undertaken by service personnel and parachuting by civilian members of MOD sponsored parachuting clubs is not subject to the day-to-day control and regulation of the British Parachuting Association (BPA). Similarly the CAA is only involved in accident investigations if the internal MOD Board of Inquiry report identifies matters which they regard as having implications outside the MOD.

2. The HSW Act ss.2 and 3 will apply to military parachuting and with the exception of parachute activities outside the General Agreement (see FOD Code IN Fh for details), will be subject to inspection.

3. Accidents to service personnel are not reportable under RIDDOR but accidents to civilians taking part in MOD sponsored parachuting together with accidents involving other persons who may be affected (eg persons on the ground hit by a parachutist) will be reportable subject to the normal criteria. 

BPA COO Tony Butler: respecting the law?

In the first instance the definition of ‘at work’ subsequent to case law has changed significantly since 1998 and is currently most likely best defined in accordance with UK Government criteria https://www.gov.uk/employment-status/worker

 

Secondly the BPA are almost certainly misleading the HSE, arguing that parachuting is not a work activity and any non-work related parachute accident is subject to BPA investigations as established in the Allocation Schedule. 

 

Thirdly, to square the circle, the BPA insurance does not cover anyone at work or affected by a work activity, as Don Canard revealed in Protection Racket. 

 

This means that display teams, instructors and coaches, tandem instructors, riggers and packers drop zone control staff and even tandem skydiving 'students' are unlikely to be adequately covered by BPA Ltd's insurance cover. 

 

Furthermore, not reporting accidents and injuries under RIDDOR is a criminal offence normally prosecuted under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and carries heavy fines. 

 

It seems clear that BPA Ltd directors, executives and representatives have connived to evade reporting duties for decades, as the death of John Ward and and other incidents indicate.  

 

This raises yet another question: why is BPA Ltd not reporting accidents and incidents in accordance with current legal requirements? Could it be that the British Parachute Association –– which claims to be empowered by the Civil Aviation Authority with regulatory oversight of parachuting in the United Kingdom –– is not Health and Safety-compliant?

           CAP660 - Parachuting

Incident and Accident

Reporting and Investigation

Reportable Accidents

4.12 An accident shall be reported to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) and the local Police if, between the time when anyone boards an aircraft with the intention of flight and such time as all have left it if:

§  Anyone is killed or seriously injured while in or on the aircraft or by direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including any part which has become detached from it.

§  The aircraft incurs damage or structural failure.

§  The aircraft is missing or completely inaccessible.

§  The aircraft commander (or if the commander is killed or incapacitated, the operator) must report immediately by telephone to the AAIB on 01252 512299. This number is monitored 24 hours a day.

Note:  There are some exceptions – full details are contained in: 

https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/airaccidents-investigation-branch.

§  In the event of an accident, an MOR must also be submitted to the CAA within 72 hours.

Mandatory Occurrence Reporting

4.14 Any incident which endangers, or which if not corrected would endanger any aircraft, its occupants or any other person, shall be reported to the CAA. These provisions also apply to any defect or malfunctioning of such an aircraft or of a ground facility which may be used in connection with its operation.

4.15 The CAA requires a written report of any incident of a serious nature or accident involving injury or damage to a third party.

4.16 Accidents occurring at locations under the control of the MoD or involving members of the armed forces who are on duty or deemed to be on duty will also be reported and investigated in accordance with MoD regulations.

4.17 The requirements of CAP 660 do not absolve any person from the requirements of other legislation or regulations relating to health and safety or the reporting of accidents, which may in some circumstances be overriding.

4.18 Incidents of a serious nature involving British Skydiving Parachute Training Organisations and Display Teams must be reported to British Skydiving, who will follow their established procedure.

4.19 Fatal accidents involving British Skydiving Parachute Training Organisations and Display Teams are subject to a British Skydiving Board of Inquiry, which is composed of experienced British Skydiving Examiners and the Chief Operating Officer and/or the Safety and Technical Officer, none of whom must have any direct interest in the organisation involved. The inquiry report will be passed to the Police, the Coroner and the CAA.

 

This all appears reasonably transparent and simple to the untrained eye but any qualified safety professional can see that the above extract from the CAP 660 seems to be written with the intention of obscuring and thus evading legal requirements and obligations. Paragraph 4.17 is particularly revealing and worth repeating:

4.17 The requirements of CAP 660 do not absolve any person from the requirements of other legislation or regulations relating to health and safety or the reporting of accidents, which may in some circumstances be overriding. 

 

This wording, which seems deliberately opaque, refers directly to SI 1471 The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013, more usually known by its acronym RIDDOR. 

These regulations require reporting to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)/Local Authorities (LA) via the established mechanism of specified events or occurrences in relation to persons at work or as a result of a work activity. 

 

RIDDOR is overriding and any exemption not to report to the HSE/LA is subject to delegation of responsibility from the HSE to another Authority for example to the Air Accident Investigation Branch via SI 321 the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accident and Incidents) Regulation 2018.

 

    Air Navigation Order 2016

    Part 2 Application of the Order

    Exceptions from application of provisions of the Order for certain classes of aircraft 

23.— (1) This article applies to 

              (a) any small balloon;

              (b) any kite weighing not more than 2kg

              (c) any small unmanned aircraft; and

             (d) any parachute including a parascending parachute.

        (2) Subject to paragraph (3), nothing in this Order applies to or in relation to an aircraft to which this article applies. 

      (3) Articles 2, 91, 92, 94, 95, 239, 241 and 257 (except 257(2)(a)) apply to or in relation    to an aircraft to which this article applies, and article 265 applies in relation to those articles. 

CHAPTER 3 Specialised Activities

Dropping of persons and grant of parachuting permissions 

 

90.—(1) Subject to paragraphs (9), (10) and (11), a person must not drop, be dropped or be permitted to drop to the surface or jump from an aircraft flying over the United Kingdom except under and in accordance with the terms of either a police air operator’s certificate or a parachuting permission granted by the CAA under this article.

(2) A person must not drop, be dropped or be permitted to drop from an aircraft in flight so as to endanger persons or property.

(3) The CAA must grant a parachuting permission if it is satisfied that the applicant is a fit person to hold the permission and is competent to conduct parachuting safely, having regard in particular to the applicant’s— 

    (a)previous conduct and experience; and

    (b)equipment, organisation, staffing and other arrangements.

(4) An aircraft must not be used for the purpose of dropping persons unless the aircraft (a)has a certificate of airworthiness and (i)that certificate has been issued or rendered valid for that aircraft under the law of the country in which the aircraft is registered; and (ii)that certificate, or the flight manual for the aircraft, includes an express provision that it may be used for that purpose; or

 (b)has been authorised for the purpose of dropping persons by — (i)the CAA or (ii)an organisation approved by the CAA to provide such an authorisation, and is operated in accordance with a written permission granted by the CAA under this article; or 

 (c)is operated under and in accordance with the terms of a police air operator’s certificate. 

(5) Every applicant for and holder of a parachuting permission must make available to the CAA if requested a parachuting manual.

(6) The holder of a parachuting permission must make such amendments or additions to its parachuting manual as the CAA may require.

(7) The holder of a parachuting permission must make its parachuting manual available to every employee or person who is engaged or may engage in parachuting activities conducted by the holder.

(8) The manual must contain all such information and instructions as may be necessary to enable such employees or persons to perform their duties.

(9) Nothing in this article applies to the descent of persons by parachute from an aircraft in an emergency.

The Air Navigation Order establishes the extent and limitations of CAA jurisdiction in relation to parachuting. The CAA has regulatory oversight of all persons on the aircraft and must give permission for a parachutist to exit. Once the parachutist has exited and cleared the aircraft, responsibility for regulatory oversight reverts from the Civil Aviation Authority to the Health and Safety Executive. 

Letter of the Law on Parachuting Oversight

REPORTING ACCIDENTS

Responsibility for receipt of reports and investigation of accidents relating to parachuting reside with the Air Accident Investigation Branch if the accident occurs in or on the aircraft, or the parachutist comes into contact with an aircraft as in the case of the death of John Ward. 

 

In other cases, skydiving and parachuting accidents are reportable under RIDDOR and fall within the jurisdiction of the HSE. This is further clarified in the CAA/HSE Memorandum of Understanding, Version 4.0 issued in December 2016 with CAP 1484 providing guidance in relation to the relevant authority remit.

 

CAP 1484

CHAPTER 1

Scope

1.2  HSE health and safety function 

§  By agreement HSE is responsible for regulating the occupational health and safety of all work activities on and around an aircraft on the ground, except the activities of crew members whilst they are on board the aircraft. 

§  The HSE retains enforcement responsibilities for health and safety employee and employer consultation legislation.

1.3 CAA aviation safety function

§  These functions include the safety of air navigation and aircraft including airworthiness, the control of air traffic, the certification of operators of aircraft and the licensing of air crew members and aerodromes.

Derivation of legal powers

1.6 HSE health and safety function

§  The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA) places general duties on employers to look after the health, safety and welfare of their employees. They also have duties to protect the health and safety of other persons who may be affected by the work activity. It places similar duties on the self-employed. It also places duties on employees to look after their own and others’ health and safety. 

§  Regulations made under the HSWA generally make more explicit what employers are required to do to manage health and safety. 

§  Both the HSWA and regulations made under the Act covering particular hazards or sectors of work require that risks arising from the work activities are controlled, so far as is reasonably practicable.

1.7 CAA aviation safety function

§  Safety regulatory functions of the Civil Aviation Authority derive from the Civil Aviation Act 1982 and from its designation as the United Kingdom competent authority for the purposes of European aviation safety regulations.

§  The detailed powers and obligations for aviation safety functions are set out in Air Navigation Order 2016 (ANO) made pursuant to Section 60 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 and in Regulations (such as the Rules of the Air Regulations, Air Navigation (General) Regulations and Air Navigation (Dangerous Goods) Regulations made pursuant to powers contained in the ANO. 

§  Additionally Regulation 216/2008 establishes the European Aviation Safety Agency and enables detailed implementing rules to be made. The implementing rules deal with initial aircraft certification, continuing airworthiness, aircrew licensing, aerodrome certification and aircraft operations. For each of these, the CAA is designated as the UK competent authority.

1.8 CAA occupational health and safety function

§  The CAA’s occupational health and safety regulation functions are set out in the Civil Aviation (Working Time) Regulations 2004 (as amended). 

§  These regulations require that the health and safety of crew members be adequately protected while they are at work for UK registered operators.

Chapter 6

Flying for personal transportation, recreational flying and parachuting

CAA remit

6.2 The CAA is responsible, under the terms of the Civil Aviation Act and the Air Navigation Order (ANO), and where applicable, European Union regulations for generally regulating the safety of all aviation activities.

HSE/LA remit

6.4 The HSE and the relevant Local Authority (LA) are responsible for enforcing health and safety law at all premises. Detail is contained in the Health and Safety enforcing regulations and associated guidance.

6.7 Many recreational and personal transport flying activities provide employment, either in connection with the main activities or as a sideline. Chapter 1 to this guidance gives details of the appropriate application of legislation.

6.8 There are certain circumstances in which the HSE/LA may become involved in investigations into accidents. For example, civilian parachuting accidents must be reported to AAIB only if the accident occurs while the injured party is in or upon an aircraft or by direct contact with any part of an aircraft. Accidents are reportable to the HSE/LA when they arise out of or in connection with work.

BPA: 44 skydiving fatalities since 1996?

BPA: 44 skydiving fatalities since 1996?

BPA Ltd COO Tony Butler has been quoted in the media as claiming to have been involved in investgations into more than fifty skydiving-related deaths during his thirty-year career with BPA Ltd. BPA-affiliated Parachute Training Organisation operators attribute many of these deaths to bad canopy-handling skills. 

The average British skydiver receives six hours of training before his or her first solo jump compared to British military parachutists who undergo around 137 hours of training during their Basic Parachute Course at RAF Brize Norton. Military parachutists at all levels are trained by government-qualified instructors whose qualifications can be proven. 

All of this raises the question of why there has never been any prosecution or other enforcement action in relation to a skydiving accident nor even a probation or improvement notice. The BPA oversees parachuting but who oversees –- and regulates –- the BPA?

Bravo Three Zero

 

BPA PROTECTION RACKET?

BPA PROTECTION RACKET?

By Don Canard

On its website, British Parachute Association Ltd trading as British Skydiving states that it “controls all aspects of skydiving on behalf of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).”.  This is a clear statement but less clear is the precise point at which the CAA delegated these regulatory powers to the BPA. It appears to have been in 1996 but executives from both organisations seem reluctant to answer questions about it. 

 

British Parachute Association Ltd Ltd trading as British Skydiving depicts itself as a not-for-profit sporting association. However, the firm has profited substantially over the years from its near-monopoly of parachuting in the United Kingdom, a monopoly it seems highly focused on completing by putting any parachuting organisation or club that refuses to pay its dues to the BPA out of business.

 

BPA Ltd declares membership figures of “around 6,400 full members and around 60,000 students each year.”. Full members pay annual subscriptions of £100, of which £40 is said to be for insurance. According to a paper published in May 2020 by an alliance of twenty-one of the twenty-nine BPA-affiliated Parachute Training Organisations, these PTOs have to pay a levy to BPA Ltd of £18.74 for each ‘student’ or ‘temporary member’. 

 

These ‘students’ include people carrying out tandem skydives for charity or for thrills. Those who wish to continue skydiving must then register as full BPA members in order to do so. The authors of the PTO paper state that £11.23 of the levy is to cover insurance. 

 

These figures suggest that BPA Ltd receives £1,124,400 a year in temporary membership fees. After deducting the insurance fees, BPA Ltd would retain about £450,600. In its Annual Statement in June 2019, BPA Ltd declared £4,066 as its income from temporary membership, equating to less than 1% of £450,600.  Several PTO operators estimate that BPA Ltd, in fact, receives twice this figure or well in excess of £2 million a year in tandem skydiving-related income alone from its affiliated PTOs, for whom tandem skydiving is worth more than £20 million a year.  

Add caption

In the 2019 Annual Statement, BPA Ltd stated that it received £739,542 in insurance-related income but spent £740,728 on insurance. However, according to the published figures, BPA Ltd’s insurance-related income would be in the region of £929,800 rather than the declared total of £739,542. Presented with this calculation, neither BPA Ltd’s outgoing Treasurer Debbie Carter nor her successor Natasha Higman responded. Nor did BPA Ltd’s Chairman Craig Poxon and BPA’s Chief Operations Officer Tony Butler.

 

When Parachute Training Organisations apply for BPA affilation, they are contractually obliged to accept and pay for the insurance cover provided by the BPA though its Leeds-based insurance brokers Romero Insurance Brokers Ltd. Full and temporary BPA members are also obliged to pay the BPA-Romero insurance levy. A number of London-based insurance brokers opined that the policy should cost no more than £500,000.

 

Kickbacks are part of the corporate insurance game. BPA Ltd never puts out to tender for insurance quotes despite the efforts of directors and council members, who say they have been threatened by “the ghost directors” and subjected to constructive dismissal tactics for challenging the opaque management of the firm. More troubling, however, is the strong possibility that the BPA-Romero insurance policy is worthless.

According to the Summary of British Skydiving Members’ Insurance, dated March 20^th 2020 and co-published by BPA and Romero, Section (b) of the General Policy Exemptions on Page 3 excludes injury to any employee. Section (d) states: "Liability assumed under contract unless such liability would have attached to the insured in the absence of said contract.". Section (e) stipulates that the exclusion clauses take effect if fees have changed hands for "professional services.". 

Simon Mabb and Justin Romero-Trigo of Romero: No Comment

 

On the same page of the policy summary, Section (c) suggests that Health & Safety at Work defence costs are covered. This seems reassuring until one recalls Section (e) of General Policy Exceptions, which annuls insurance cover if fees have changed hands for professional services. If the (alleged) insured party is covered by Section (e) of General Policy Exceptions, how can he or she be covered under Section (c)? 

 

We put these questions to Justin Romero-Trigo and Simon Mabb of Romero but received no response. Nor did BPA Chairman Craig Poxon and BPA COO Tony Butler respond. 

 

In summary, as soon as a Full or Temporary BPA member pays any kind of fee to a BPA-affiliated PTO, instructor or examiner to make a parachute jump, the BPA insurance is null and void. A number of criminal offences spring to mind when one looks at this apparent insurance scam but the phrase that trumps them all is protection racket. Skydivers are being coerced into paying BPA Ltd for protection that they will clearly never have.

 

  With Mike Bravo's analysis of BPA Health and Safety compliance in mind, would any reputable insurance broker or underwriter agree to insure a high-risk aviation-related sporting association whose CAP 660 operating manual omits important references to Health and Safety regulations and practices? In the case of BPA Ltd's insurers, it may be a moot point as the policy seems deliberately worded with the aim of rendering claims difficult or impossible.    

Don Canard

BRITISH PARACHUTE ASSOCIATION - CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER?

John Ward: victim of BPA negligence?

 Since the Civil Aviation Authority delegated sports and civilian parachuting oversight to the British Parachute Association in 1996, there have been at least forty-four skydiving-related fatalities and countless life-changing injuries. Some of these fatalities have resulted in murder investigations. There have also been investigations for attempted murder, manslaughter and corporate manslaughter. In this short series, BPA Watch will look at a few of these cases and the BPA cover-up culture, beginning with the death of John Ward in 1991. 

BPA Watch is joined by Mike Bravo, a Chartered Health and Safety Practitioner known to the CAA and the BPA by his real name, and Don Canard. Mike and Don are Airborne Forces veterans and, as such, government-trained, professional parachutists. Of the CAA, Mike says: "In my professional opinion, the Civil Aviation Authority is unlikely to be empowered to oversee parachuting. According to EASA and the ANO, the CAA's authority over skydivers and parachutists ends once the exit and clear the aircraft. At this point, authority and enforcement revert to the Health and Safety Executive.

"It is a complex issue of regulation, enforcement and legal compliance. As a H&S professional, I initially wondered why there had never been any prosecution or enforcement actions regarding the forty-plus skydiving fatalities and life-changing injuries since 1996. Having researched this subject, I now have the answers and it is not good. Conspiring to breach Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 is a serious criminal offence. No wonder the BPA has gone to such efforts to exclude the HSE from skydiving.". 

Roman Kandells

 

CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER COVER-UPS?

By Don Canard

 

BPA Patron HRH Prince Charles

Civil Aviation Authority executives from the top downwards tend to be reasonably communicative –– as long as one does not ask awkward questions. When asked, for instance, who authorised the delegation of parachuting oversight and regulation to British Parachute Association Ltd, senior and middle-ranking executives of this quasi-non-governmental agency clam up. 

When asked why BPA Ltd pays substantially less to the CAA each year than the fees the company ought to be paying, according to the CAA's own Scheme of Charges, CAA executives either do not answer or answer questions one has not asked.

Perhaps the quasi-non-governmental mandarins of the CAA feel untouchable because of their quango status. Perhaps the BPA and its ghost directors feel protected by the CAA, the Royal Aero Club or by the patronage of HRH Prince Charles, who is also Colonel-in-Chief of The Parachute Regiment and, as such, a government-trained parachutist. HRH agreed to be Patron of BPA when it was still a genuine sporting association run for the most part by serving and former Armed Forces officers. 

Today, BPA Ltd is run by a rather shady, secretive cabal of ghost directors, none of whom seems able to produce any proof of professional qualifications justifying a regulatory role in relation to parachuting and skydiving. Chief Operations Officer Tony Butler's name does not appear on the list of 123 past and present directors of this purportedly not-for-profit company. Said to receive an annual salary north of £100,000 and other perks, Mr Butler has a penchant for late-model Bentley cars bearing his personalised number plate XXX AKB. AKB stands for Anthony Keiron Butler. Mr Butler has been on the BPA Ltd payroll for over thirty years since being engaged as one of the firm's two National Safety and Training Officers in 1990.

Tony Butler - Personalised Bentleys

Mr Butler was present when BPA skydiver John Ward fell 13,000 feet to his death over the Tilstock Sport Parachute Centre in Shropshire on August 26th 1991. Ward was participating in a 16-man canopy-stacking display staged by the BPA to round off its August bank holiday skydiving meet at Tilstock. 

John Ward's death was accidental but Shropshire police wanted to charge at least five parties with manslaughter and corporate manslaughter because of the negligence and reckless endangerment involved. The suspects included: Jump Master Jeff Page; Load Oganiser Ian Marshall; BPA Chief Club Instructor Lyn George; BPA Parachute Pilot and Parachute Pilot Examiner Dave Harrison, who also co-owned the Tilstock Sport Parachute Centre.

The fifth party was BPA Ltd, which would have been prosecuted for corporate manslaughter. There was also talk of charging the owners and operators of the Embraer EMB 110 Bandeirante aircraft involved in John Ward's death for, allegedly, telling CCI Lyn George that their Bandeirante had the necessary CAA clearances for parachuting in the United Kingdom.

The AAIB report, published in December 1991, stated that the Bandeirante, registered as G-SWAG and based at Southend Airport, was flown to Tilstock by a pilot who then handed it over to a second pilot who arrived by road. The second pilot was described in the report as a BPA-qualified Parachute Pilot and Parachute Pilot Examiner with 1,069 flying hours logged.

According to the Air Accident Investigation Branch, BPA skydivers had made more than 600 jumps from the Bandeirante that weekend, before John Ward's death after his head struck the aircraft's tailplane as he exited. However, the AIBB report is not clear about which pilot was at the controls on the morning on August 26th 1991.

Ian Marshall –– Red Devil 1978

The BPA ordered its Safety and Training Committee to convene an inquiry, headed by Tony Knight. The pilot, unnamed in the AAIB report, was identified as Dave Harrison, who was also said to have been a co-owner of G-SWAG. 

BPA insiders confirm that Dave Harrison was a BPA-rated Parachute Pilot and Parachute Pilot Examiner. The AIBB report, however, does not mention these qualifications in the foreword to its report, instead stating simply that the pilot at the controls when the accident occurred held a Commercial Pilot's Licence.

Ian Marshall, a former Parachute Regiment Red Devils Team skydiver who was the designated Load Organiser for the canopy-stacking display in which John Ward was participating, is adamant that Harrison was not flying G-SWAG during the canopy-stacking display. 

Marshall told BPA Watch: "I don't know who the pilot was but he wasn't Dave Harrison. This pilot had already flown twelve lifts that morning and we were the thirteenth. The other lifts were skydivers, who tend to exit in a bunch. For that kind of exit, the pilot needs to compensate for the sudden weight loss at the back of the aircraft by lighting the nose because the rear of aircraft rises. We, on the other hand, were exiting one-by-one for the canopy-stacking display, a bit like military parachutists.  The pilot should have adjusted the trim during the jump phase and dropped the nose. He lifted the nose and John Ward was hit by the tailplane.".  

Skydiver Number Ten, the tenth skydiver in the stick or jump order, had checked Ward's equipment. Ward was Number Seven. The AAIB report summarised his testimony: "He noted that, as jumpers four, five and six passed close to the tail following their exit. He also noted that, as jumper number seven stood in the doorway, facing inboard, his right foot was about nine inches aft of the red painted line on the floor. He saw him exit and turn to face the direction of travel of the aircraft; shortly afterwards the back of his helmet struck the tail of the aircraft. The observer then jumped out of the aircraft and lost contact.".  

The AAIB report describes the pilot as stating that he was still climbing at an air indicated speed of 130 knots with the aircraft nose 12° up pitch when he felt "a slight and short vibration", indicating that the jumpers were exiting the aircraft. He reacted by lowering speed to 110 knots and dropping the nose. On reading the AAIB report for the first time twenty-nine years later, Ian Marshall said: "If that is what the pilot told the AAIB investigators, he was lying. Had he dropped the nose, the jumpers exiting the aircraft would have passed under the tailplane without any trouble.". 

Marshall recalled: "Two AIBB investigators came to see me. They showed me a manifest that was not, in fact, the manifest I had completed and signed on the day. The version shown to me by the AIBB was written up afterwards. I happened to have a copy of the original and made them a photocopy of it in a shop across the road from my place. 

"There was a person missing from the AIBB manifest: the girl sitting in the co-pilot's seat. There were nineteen people aboard, not eighteen. Also, I had crossed myself off as Jump Master and put in Jeff Page's name; Jeff was the Jump Master. I never heard from the AIBB afterwards. As far as I know, the inquest was never closed.".  

Tony Knight: Looking for scapegoats?

Of the BPA inquiry under Tony Knight, Ian Marshall recalled: "They tried to blame me because one of the jumpers, apparently, had a falsified medical certificate. Then they raised questions about equipment checks on the ground. They were clearly trying to pin negligence on me but I was the Load Organiser. None of this had anything to do with me. 

"I was checking equipment and documents on the ground but only the jumpers. It would have been up to our National Coach and Safety Officer to check the documentation of the aircraft and the pilot.". Ian Marshall knows his subject because he was a director of BPA Ltd at the time. 

The pathologist who examined John Ward's remains told AAIB investigators that Ward "was probably rendered unconscious by the impact with the horizontal stabiliser" before falling 13,000 feet to his death. The AIBB report noted "minor damage to the leading edge of the left horizontal stabiliser". John Ward did not die as a consequence of faulty equipment or a lack of safety checks before emplaning.  

The BPA magazine Sport Parachutist published a letter from Jeff Page in its December 1991 issue. Page wrote: "Unfortunately the coroners [sic] enquiry has now been put back to 'Feb 1992' so the bulk of the membership will be voting prior to the findings of the court being made public.". Page was referring to the imminent BPA Council elections. 

Page continued: "I, as a prime witness, have read the report from STC and am absolutely disgusted with the amount of 'blatant' breaches of the Operations Manual. The fact that a lad was killed seems to be going over the heads of some of those concerned. What I am trying to say is that we have nominees for council who are basically politicians. [...] Watch out for the 'ladder climbers' on their way to the Royal Aero Club.".

Page was referring to the BPA's Safety and Training Committee, the BPA having convened its own inquiry into John Ward's death. Page's letter carried on:  "I was the jumpmaster [sic] of the Bandeirante who was initially branded the culprit. I was the jumpmaster who was going to be charged with manslaughter. For all those who knew that the aircraft was totally illegal, and used it for capital gain... I hope they have your [votes].".

As the AAIB report records, BPA Chief Club Instructor Lyn George had initially booked a Shorts 330 aircraft for the weekend event but had been unable to obtain the necessary CAA clearances in time. George then booked a Shorts SC7 Skyvan and was also offered G-SWAG. The AAIB report stated: "As far as [Lyn George] was concerned, this was an appealing idea as, to his knowledge, this type of aircraft had not been used before, in the United Kingdom, in the parachuting role. [Lyn George] stated that he was assured by a representative of the operating company that the necessary CAA authorisation had been obtained, but he did not personally check the documentation.". 

Nor did Tony Butler, the BPA National Safety and Training Officer who was not only present at the Tilstock event but, according to witnesses, had himself jumped from G-SWAG several times. In October 2020, the BPA Drop Zone Controller on duty at Tilstock on the morning of August 26th 1991 sent the following comment to BPA Watch: "It was nearly thirty years ago but I was DZ control at the time and I don't know anything about a falsified manifest. I did feel sorry for [Tony Butler] who arrived as a fun jumper but became NSTO through circumstances.".

As BPA records show, Tony Butler was one of the firm's two NSTOs or, more precisely, National Coach and Safety Officers, well before the John Ward incident. However, he does not seem to have checked the credentials of the pilot or the claimed CAA clearances pertaining to G-SWAG. Like Lyn George, Tony Butler would surely have known that this was the first time the Bandeirante was used in the parachuting role in the United Kingdom. Unlike Lyn George, it was part of Tony Butler's job to be aware of such facts. 

The AAIB report stated that the pilot –– whoever he was –– was BPA-rated but not on the Bandeirante in the parachuting role. A BPA NSTO could reasonably be expected to be familiar with the Parachute Pilots and Parachute Pilot Examiners on the BPA register and their qualifications. If unfamiliar with the pilot, the BPA NSTO ought to have asked to see his licence. Tony Butler did none of these things, according to witnesses, one of whom recalls overhearing Tony Butler being told to "disappear quickly". 

The BPA inquiry run by Tony Knight concluded that the Bandeirante did not conform to BPA safety regulations.  G-SWAG was not cleared for parachuting by the Civil Aviation Authority in the configuration in which it was being operated. Nor was the aircraft approved for flight in British skies with its cargo door removed. The AAIB report was clear on these points.

 

Jeff Page concluded his letter to Sport Parachutist by noting: "The BPA Board of Enquiry have subsequently totally exonerated me.".  As in the case of Load Master Ian Marshall, the BPA was unable to attribute any negligence to Jeff Page, who was merely the Jump Master. The AAIB report makes it clear that Marshall and Page carried out their duties impeccably, that the pilot was not qualified to operate the Bandeirante in the parachuting role and that the aircraft type was not cleared by the CAA for parachute dropping. 

Page ended with a postscript: "Thanks to Dave (where is he now?) and all the others involved for the inspiration and need for this letter.".  If Page was referring to Dave Harrison, several of "the others involved" recall that Harrison vanished from the skydiving scene in the United Kingdom for several years.

The Shropshire police were forced to drop their manslaughter investigation after Harrison's lawyers demanded that an independent autopsy be carried out on John Ward's remains. However, Ward's body had been released by the authorities and cremated, despite the ongoing criminal investigation. Attempts to locate any coroners court findings relating to John Ward's death have so far proved fruitless, bearing a widely-held belief that the inquest was never closed.  

The premature cremation of Ward's remains notwithstanding, the intended manslaughter prosecutions might have been unsuccessful for other reasons. Defence counsel would probably have argued that while the aircraft type was not CAA-approved for parachuting, it was not illegal per se to parachute from the Bandeirante. As for the cargo door, it was designed to be removed even if its removal requiring drifting out the hinge pins with a hammer and punch, a modification carried out by Dave Harrison on the first day of the three-day meeting.

Dave Harrison now runs a parachute training centre in Thailand and did not respond to BPA Watch's emails. When G-SWAG was photographed in July 1992 by David Lunn for unrelated reasons, she was owned by BAC Charters and based in Jersey, beyond mainland British jurisdiction. 

The confusion over the identity of the pilot who was flying G-SWAG is underlined by the AAIB's reference to two pilots and Ian Marshall's recollection of the falsified manifest, which made no mention of the bikini-clad girl sitting in the co-pilot's seat. Although the AAIB report names nobody, the investigators seem to have taken Marshall's genuine manifest into account as they referred to a "passenger". All of this raises questions: who was flying G-SWAG when John Ward was killed –– apparently through pilot inexperience and error –– and why has he not been identified? Who was protecting him?

Tony Butler is on record as saying that he has been involved in the investigation of more than fifty skydiving-related fatalities but like his friends at the CAA, he clams up whenever John Ward's name is mentioned. He was not only one of two BPA NSTOs at the time but was a witness to Ward's death, which raises questions: if the BPA Safety and Training Committee excused Butler from sitting on the inquiry panel because he was a witness to the incident, why did the BPA inquiry not call him to testify? Why is Butler's name nowhere to be seen in any of the available documentation?

The evidence and the testimony suggest that Tony Butler failed to do his job that day and that the BPA engaged in a cover up which involved keeping Butler's name out of the proceedings and trying to pin the blame on several non-BPA employees in order to avoid being prosecuted for corporate manslaughter. Five years later, in 1996, the CAA delegated regulatory oversight for sports parachuting to the BPA but CAA senior management has not explained who authorised the CAA, as a quango, to delegate power to a non-accountable private company like BPA Ltd. 

Far from being the not-for-profit sporting association it claims to be, British Parachute Association Ltd is a lucrative enterprise. Its profitability over the years has been boosted by the failure of the Civil Aviation Authority to charge BPA Ltd anything like the appropriate annual fees according to its own Scheme of Charges. Other British parachuting associations and display teams accuse the BPA of building a monopoly over sports and civilian parachuting in the United Kingdom, aided and abetted by the CAA. 

Tony Butler: untouchable?

Former BPA directors and council members who have spoken to BPA Watch say that the BPA Ltd Council is in reality a non-executive body and that the firm is really run by a cabal of ghost directors over which Tony Butler presides. 

The evidence suggests that they are not exaggerating. Some observers wonder how Mr Butler has acquired and held onto his power. They wonder what his leverage is. As Mark Bravo remarked, conspiracy to breach Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 is a serious criminal offence.  Anyone involved in criminal conspiracies of this nature would have considerable leverage over his co-conspirators.

Nobody was ever held to account for John Ward's death by Crown authorities. The British Parachute Association made a scapegoat of Chief Club Instructor Lyn George by withdrawing his BPA ratings but no BPA Ltd director, safety officer or employee was sanctioned.   

No action was taken against the pilot – whoever he was –even though he was not qualified to drop parachutists from the Bandeirante.  Given the strong possibility that John Adams died as a result of pilot inexperience and error, why did the BPA not withdraw Dave Harrison's BPA ratings? Was it because, as Ian Marshall –– who was also a director of BPA Ltd at the time –– recalls, Dave Harrison was not flying G-SWAG that morning?

While it is too late to prosecute any former or serving BPA Ltd officers and officials for corporate manslaughter and conpiracy over John Ward's death, there have been numerous other fatalities and injuries in the intervening years, some of which might justify charges of negligence, reckless endangerment and corporate manslaughter. 

And then there is the question of criminal conspiracy, which is an awkward question indeed, given the endorsement of BPA Ltd –– trading as British Skydiving –– by the Civil Aviation Authority, the Royal Aero Club and the Heir to the Crown, HRH Prince Charles.

Don Canard