The CAA permits its mini-me skydiving and parachuting regulator to get away with this lethal lawbreaking and so do the CAA quango's masters at the Department for Transport. Worse yet is that the HSE itself condones it while skydivers continue dying through refusing to assume its legal role and duty as the regulator.
RAF Sergeant Rachel Fisk is merely the latest skydiver to die. The HSE has at least issued an Improvement Notice (see below) proving that Sgt Fisk was killed by what amounts to corporate negligence. However, the HSE has once again allowed BPA/BS to slither away unpunished, back into the netherworld over which its ghost supremo Tony Butler rules.
The HSE has hung it on the RAF. Better than that from the viewpoint of RAF 22 Group commander Air Vice Marshall Richard Maddison, the HSE seems to have hung it on a relatively junior-ranking staff officer. Stitching up the RAF was a first for the BPA/BS, which generally sets its sights lower when searching for scapegoats f deaths and life-changing injuries on its watch; the firm usually targets its own affiliated parachute centre operators or any BPA-rated instructor dispatching skydivers or running ground operations.
Does the undue influence of the BPA also extend beyond the capture and compromise of the Department for Transport through its uncontrolled quango the CAA to the capture and compromise of the Ministry of Defence – the answer seems to be a resounding 'yes'.
When it suits BPA/BS, they play to the peanut gallery as a benevolent amateur sports association but let's not lose sight of the facts that the firm has a minimum annual turnover of £1.7 million – which may be double that figure if its alleged insurance-related machinations are taken into account – and pays its senor officials six-figure annual salaries yet spends no more than £5k a year on safety-related matters.
The least one can say of the CAA-BPA cartel is that the BPA gets a lot from the CAA in return for the £30k annual fee the firm pays to the quango's General Aviation division. Not only can BPA/BS evade all kinds of laws under CAA patronage, the CAA actively aids and abets the maintenance of an illegal BPA/BS commercial monopoly by obstructing and preventing the entry of other UK parachuting associations to the marketplace. BPA Watch has amply reported on all of this.
The 5th Edition of the BPA-CAA document CAP 660 was described by some critics as opening the way for BPA/BS to exert undue control over military skydiving and parachuting. These fears were ridiculed by some senior military officers but the death of Sgt Fisk and the way in which BPA/BS was clearly able to drive the investigation raises questions, not least of which is how BPA/BS came to be so influential in the death of a serving military NCO during military-run adventure training on MOD property, namely RAF Weston-on-the-Green.
According to BPA insiders and victims of BPA bullying, the BPA forces Parachute Training Organisation operators to declare that employees and contractors are not 'at work' in order to evade HSE interference and they get away with this because the HSE allows them to do so. However, Rachel Fisk and her colleagues were at work.
All skydiving equipment provided to instructors for work purposes or otherwise available for hire is, as a minimum, subject to the requirements of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulation, the Working at Height Regulations 2005, Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992 and the Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998. To this regard, who is reasonable for fulfilling relevant duties under these regulations?
It is an established fact that Sgt Fisk was at work, therefore incumbent obligations are applicable. Many of the real experts and professionals are stating that the ‘burble theory’ purported by the unqualified amateurs at the BPA is totally incorrect and aimed at diverting attention away from the fact that it was an equipment functionality failure that resulted in Sgt Fisk’s reserve not deploying.
CAP 660 states that skydivers "must only use equipment acceptable to British Skydiving" which clearly indicates that the BPA are responsible for control over equipment standards – little wonder they are pushing the ‘burble theory’ as any equipment failure makes the BPA culpable under numbers-related regulations.
The Law stipulates that the CAA must authorise skydivers and parachutists to exit an aircraft in flight. The CAA can only withhold its authorisation – Parachuting or Special Parachuting Permissions – if it can show just cause. The Air Navigation Order 2016 (amended) is clear: the CAA must issue such permissions.
The CAA itself quotes from Article 23 of the ANO, addressing exceptions from the provisions of the Order. This is an important article, because it exempts small unmanned aircraft (as well as small balloons, small kites and parachutes) from the majority of the ANO’s provisions, and it then specifies those articles which still apply.
The legislation is clear: the CAA is the regulator whilst skydivers are on the aircraft and must give permission for the skydivers to exit the aircraft [at altitude] under Article 90 of the Air Navigation Order 2016 (amended) (ANO).
Once the skydiver has exited and cleared the aircraft in accordance with Article 23 of the ANO, the ANO is not applicable nor is the CAA any longer the regulator – matters revert to overarching legislation, in particular the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999.
The HSE is in reality parachuting's Enforcing Authority.
This is confirmed in CAA publication CAP1484 CAA/HSE/HSENIMemorandum of Understanding guidance. The document supports the CAA/HSE/HSENI MOU and explains in greater detail the enforcement responsibilities of each regulator and the interfaces between the organisations.
It is highly arguable that CAA publication CAP660 deliberately omits Article 23 and CAP1484, and the matters to which they pertain, thus facilitating evasion of the Law as the CAA and its illegally-appointed mini-me quango BPA/BS see fit.
“The Air Navigation Order 2016 (ANO) like most UK legislation is not prescriptive; it is goal-setting in nature, with the objective of driving advancement in performance standards and best practice, continuous improvement and the development of compliance criteria.
"Subsequently, there are no instructions for the duty holder to follow in the ANO regarding parachuting. Article 90 simply requires that the particular parachute organisation or team are in possession of a permission and/or exemption issued by the CAA in order to exit an aircraft in flight and consequently adhere to the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and regulations made thereunder.”.
However, the CAA quango lays down a smokescreen of obfuscation. The CAA has no transparently articulated application or assessment processes, in contradiction of the principals upon which UK law is based and in direct opposition to government directives relating to deregulation. There is no appropriate appeals process in place or otherwise independent oversight. There is no ombudsman.
All parachute dropping carried out from civil registeredaircraft over the UK is regulated by the CAA and must be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Air Navigation Order.
CAP 660 Parachuting is a comprehensive-looking source of information containing rules, regulations and guidance on:
- Legal requirements
- Parachuting operations
- Parachuting displays
- Monitoring and audit
- Safety management systems and risk assessment
- Relevant legislation
Not only does the CAA seem to be taking a £30,000 annual bribe from its delegated regulator, the quango's directorate seems also to take a cue from the BPA in terms of propaganda, misdirection and lying with an element of truth.
Many parts of CAP 660 are a direct cut-and-paste insertion from the legally dubious and rigid rule-based BPA Operations Manual – the only operations manual accepted by the CAA, which joins with BPA/BS in touting it as "the gold standard".
CAP 660 is, however, only advisory. It has no legal standing and is not signed off by the Secretary of State. As such, it is not the equivalent of, for instance, a HSE-Approved Code of Practice.
The content does not provide any kind of regulatory framework or articulate any assessment criteria or evaluation process.
The CAA cannot enforce the provisions of this highly questionable document because they would need to refer back to the ANO – which clearly establishes that their jurisdiction ceases once the skydiver has exited and cleared the aircraft.
However, it is well-documented that the CAA believe that they can make up any rules and policies that suit them and act as prosecutor, judge and jury if anyone dares to object or formally complain.
CAA corporate culture is far from ‘just’ and is in most cases opaque. The overall attitude of the authority seems to be ‘we are the CAA, we refuse to engage with you and if you don’t accept that, then we shall revoke your licence, permissions or certificates’.
Bravo Three Zero CMIOSH told BPA Watch: “CAP 660 is poorly constructed and amateurish in nature, the content is quite extraodinary and one can only draw two reasonable conclusions; either the authors or, more importantly, those who approved CAP 660 [the CAA legal counsel] were totally incompetent and have little knowledge and understanding of the law. [BPAW established that CAA Legal Counsel lied about CAP 660 – Editor] or it was a deliberate attempt to evade the law.
"CAP 660 is in breach of numerous Statutory Instruments (Acts of Parliament and Regulations) or made a conscious and deliberate decision –– i.e. collusion and connivance –– to breach and/or evade a host of legal requirements, onus obligations and incumbent duties, thereby committing criminal offences.
"From the substantive available evidence, the latter is the most likely scenario, which is extremely worrisome, as this would have required the collusion and collaboration in extensive law braking and malfeasance of an Authority, albeit one that is mendacious and constantly found to be disrepute i.e. the CAA.”.
Mike Bravo CMIOSH said: "CAA duplicity is clearly evident: the CAA does not recognise Health and Safety legislation and HSE jurisdiction nor does the CAA accept current best practice because the BPA pays the CAA £30,000 per annum for their Approval of Persons status and to furnish reports to the CAA.
"To put this simply, the BPA tell the CAA what they can and cannot do as a regulator, including telling them to act illegally, protect the BPA monopoly and cover up criminal activities – and the CAA agree – and further publicly state that this is Government policy.
"Mainstream business shifted away from rigid rule based operational manuals to a risk management approach more commonly referred to as Safety Management Systems more than two decades ago.
"This was supported by the publication of various recognised management systems; HSE publication HS(G)65 Managing for Health and Safety, British Standards Institute and International Standards Organisation standards such as BS 8800 – HS(G)65, BS EN ISO 9001, BS 8800 – 14001, OHSAS 18001 and more recently BS EN ISO 45001.
"None of these internationally recognised standards is acknowledged or adopted by the BPA and so, therefore, they are also rejected by the CAA. The CAA or rogue directors of the CAA are up to their necks in lawbreaking.
"These standards require evidence-based and demonstrable compliance with health and safety law, and are independently assessed and assured by accredited and recognised Awarding and Certifying Bodies under UK Accrediting Certification (UKAC) scheme – which the BPA do not deem appropriate as they do not conform to the BPA's much-vaunted operations manual.
"This manual is held up as "world class" and "the gold standard" by the CAA and other BPA partners like the RAF and people are – falsely – warned that a breach of the BPA or BS Operations Manual is a breach of the law.
"And when Joe Public is told this by people who seem to have the law behind them, he knuckles under, doesn't he? Especially if he thinks his BPA ratings are going to be taken from him. He doesn't even know those ratings are worthless in any legal sense!".
A current BPA Vice-President recently described the BPA as follows: “The BPA is an insignificant amateur sports body that has been ‘bigging’ themselves up for years, yet they still operate like a small club working out of the backroom of a pub in the 1960s”
The CAA denies that CAP 660 gives the CAA and BPA/BS regulatory control over military parachuting activity or operations.
The management of Health and Safety in Defence – Ministry of Defence – is established in Joint Services Publication (JSP) 375. This collection of documents is the corporate publication that provides guidance to defence in meeting its legal health and safety obligations.
It provides a common structure for the organisation and arrangements for the day to day management of health and safety within defence. JSP 375 provides the direction that must be followed in accordance with Statute, or Policy mandated by defence or on defence by central government and the guidance and best practice that will assist the user to comply.
MOD establishments such as the Robson Academy – responsible for RAF Weston on the Green, Joint Services Adventure Training (JSAT) sports parachute operations – should also conduct activities in accordance with JSP822 which provides defence direction and guidance for training and education. It is the system that must be used by those who are involved in the analysis, design, delivery, assurance, management and governance of Defence training and education.
2.1 Introduction to Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT)1. Service Inquiries and injury reporting are an ever-present reminder of the importance of safety at the heart of Defence activity and Training is no exception. Increasing scrutiny and drive for continuous improvement demands that safety does not solely apply to perceived ‘high risk’ physical activity and will be a golden thread throughout this policy. Commanders have a duty of care to trainees and their families not only in terms of Care and Welfare (C&W) but also in Health and Safety (H&S) with respect to the delivery of training capability. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that training is delivered and managed safely by suitable qualified and experienced personnel (SQEP), through the conduct of dynamic risk assessments and rigorous assurance activity.
JSP822 further establishes the intention to maintain a strategic and coherent approach across defence, in relation to full national qualifications and accreditation schemes under the [civilian] Regulated Qualifications Framework overseen by Ofqual. The document provides comprehensive guidance, to duty holders, to ensuring a close fit with external academic and skills development – national vocational qualifications (NVQ).
Regulatory Article 2355 - Static Line and Freefall Parachuting Guidance Material 2355(2) Procedures for Static Line and Free Fall Parachuting
13. Sport Parachuting can be conducted for military purposes, eg: engagement events such as air shows.
14. Where Sport Parachuting has been approved by the ADH or AM(MF) the National Governing Body procedures detailed in the British Skydiving Operations Manual may provide some guidance for orders and procedures. However, the procedures set out in the Tac AT manuals and HQ 2 Gp Operations Manuals for equivalent military parachute systems provide sound guidance on how the activity may be conducted which the ADH or AM(MF) may wish to consult prior to promulgating Sport Parachuting procedures.
This and other MOD documentation require the application of a significant administrative process that would need to be systematically worked through in order to demonstrate that activities such as skydiving are safe and legislatively compliant. This would include, as a minimum:
- Compliance with Health and Safety Executive codes of practice or otherwise possession of relevant endorsements
- Evidence of certification to the appropriate quality (9001) and/or safe management (18001 or 45001) standard
- Training accreditation in accordance with the Regulated Qualifications Framework
- Confirmation of Insurances policies
- Formal nomination of responsible person(s)
- Safety plans and risk assessments
- Assessment and benchmarking process against MOD regulations and standards, in this particular instance 2 Group – Parachute Operations Manual (POM)
Given the inherent risk to life involved in skydiving, it is would behoove the MOD to apply the correct level of diligence to understanding the level of safety, legislative and regulatory compliance in relation to such operations, the associated criteria, procedures and processes under which activities were conducted, utilising relevant subject matter expertise and advice from other competent agencies, as necessary.
In this regard, the MOD recently stated:
“When military personnel are conducting adventure training or sports parachuting through civilian bodies whether in the UK or overseas, this is conducted under the regulations and operating procedures of those civilian bodies. However, military Aviation Duty Holders will retain duty of care responsibility for those military personnel. Consequently, there are well established processes as part of that duty of care responsibility for military aviation duty holders, to identify any difference in regulatory, safety management or operating standards for those civilian bodies and assess any risks as part of the military safety management system. This will enable the military to mitigate any duty of care risks from differences in standards, where this is appropriate”.
This may, on the surface, appear to be a reasonable statement from the MOD, but to the trained eye it is totally ridiculous. In simple terms this statement really means:
"We accept the unaccredited and poor level of training standards together with the legally non-compliant and highly questionable operational manual of an amateur sports organisation even though we know significant risks to life exist. We have our comprehensive and robust systems, processes and procedure in place i.e. the 2 Group POM, that we chosen not to implement; instead we decided to mitigate the risk by – allegedly – retrospectively applying our safety management systems, in an attempt to turn a pig’s ear into a silk purse – or in other words we accepted exceeding low and legally non compliant BPA standards and still failed to achieve them.".
However, HSE document OC 801/2 Supplement 1 MOD parachuting articulates matters as follows:
1. As a general rule parachuting undertaken by service personnel and parachuting by civilian members of MOD sponsored parachuting clubs is not subject to the day-to-day control and regulation of the British Parachuting Association (BPA).
To contradict and confuse matters further, BPA/BS does not accept any recognised parachute and instructor qualifications awarded under the Regulated Qualifications Framework, including those awarded by the MOD as a recognised Awarding Body, nor do does BPA/BS recognise military jumps and numbers of military jumps carried out.
MOD JSAT sports parachuting centres are required to affiliate to BPA/BS and consequently are contractually obliged to operate in accordance with the BPA Operations Manual. This is also confirmed in an email – confidentially provided to BPA watch – written by RAF Group Captain Martin Smith, Commandant of the Robson Academy of Resilience at RAF Weston-on-the-Green:
“RAF Weston on the Green, JSAT sports parachuting centre - operates under the auspices of British Skydiving - the National Governing Body (NGB) - who externally assure our parachuting activity.".
It is also understood that BPA representatives audited – obviously extremely poorly – RAF WOTG's JSAT sports parachute centre, a BPA Affiliated Parachute Training Organisation (PTO), in July 2021 and presumably provided a ‘clean bill of health’. Surely the HSE ought to have addressed its Improvement Notice to the BPA instead of the RAF?
The question must be asked, how can the unqualified charlatans of the BPA externally assure the compliance and safety of any PTO business operation, and more specifically an MOD establishment, staffed by highly qualified military parachute jump instructors? The death of Sgt Rachel Fisk seems to provide the answer: they can't and the HSE Improvement Notice proves it.
Have the recommendations from the Service Inquiry into the death of a soldier whilst parachuting at Bad Lippspringe, been ignored by RAF WOTG JSAT sports parachute (skydive) centre?
Why were the comprehensive and robust MOD safety requirements not applied by Robson Academy to RAF Weston on the Green (WOTG), JSAT sports parachute (skydiving) operation?
Why was RAF WOTG JSAT not working to the safety standards encapsulated in the 2 Group POM?
This brings us back to our previous question; does the undue influence of the BPA also extend beyond the capture and compromise of the Department for Transport through its uncontrolled quango the CAA to the capture and compromise of the Ministry of Defence – the answer seems to be a resounding 'yes'.
The CAA has approved an amateur sports body to conduct audits for and on behalf of the CAA, yet the BPA does not possess the capability in terms of qualified and competence personal or expert professional support together with the prerequisite suitable and sufficient systems, appropriately robust and accepted procedures to conduct an external audits of any third party and adequately compliance assure, in particular with regards to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and Regulations made thereunder.
The BPA is not a Professional, Statutory or Regulatory Body nor is the BPA an Accrediting or Certifying body, as defined under any relevant Statutory Instrument or recognised framework.
The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) is the appointed National Accreditation Body for the UK, which means the organisation performs accreditation with the relevant authority derived from HM Government.
Any Certification Bodies who intend to issue accredited certification – i.e. ISO 9001 Quality Management Systems or ISO 45001 Health and Safety Management Systems – must be audited and accredited by an Accreditation Body –i.e. UKAS – against the requirements of the ISO 17021 Standard; accreditation to which the BPA have not at this juncture attained or is ever likely to attain. Furthermore, the BPA’s own management arrangements are not currently certificated under either BS EN ISO 9001 or 45001.
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| BPA Ltd COO Tony Butler: legal netherworld |
The BPA is not a National Awarding Body or otherwise a recognised or accredited training provider under the National Regulated Qualifications Framework overseen by Ofqual.
The BPA cannot therefore issue academic qualifications or national vocational qualifications (NVQ). Any of the attendance badges and proficiency stickers provided by the BPA – an unaccredited and unrecognised amateur sports organisations – do not pertain to any form of recognised qualification and generally have little standing, particularly in the workplace and business environment or otherwise under law. As one BPA instructor recently commented;
“My BPA ratings are absolutely worthless - they didn’t even qualify me get a job stacking shelves at Tesco during the COVID shutdown.”.
Yet the BPA have the audacity to recommend to the CAA that BPA or British Skydiving stickers and badges are the only ‘qualifications’ are acceptable to the CAA but that recognised qualification awarded under the Qualifications Regulated Framework are not acceptable – a perfect example of the broken CAA system.
National Governing Sports Bodies such as the BPA are generally self-appointed; however, some are recognised by the Sports Council and thus form an element of the sport, to which the relevant body organises, governs and administers the sport on a national basis.
Traditionally NGSBs may be viewed as the custodians and guardians of their sport; however, these bodies are not Enforcing Authorities and have no derived Regulatory powers from HM Government. Furthermore, the BPA has no competence to advise businesses on legal matters, in particular Health and Safety Law – that is the responsibility of the HSE.
BPA annual reports and accounts state that BPA consistently spends less than £5,000 per year on safety; little wonder that there have been 50 fatal accidents, hundreds of life changing and thousands of serious injuries over the 25-year period since BPA obtained its contentious and illegal Exposition from the CAA.
This abysmal safety record is extraordinary and the death toll continues unabated, whilst BPA officials line their pockets with six figure salaries and the BPA amasses £4 million in assets and funds.
The death of Sgt Rachel Fisk was eminently avoidable. Such basic and fundamental failures under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety Work Regulations 1999 clearly pave the way for the Crown Prosecution Service to pursue charges of corporate manslaughter via various avenues.
So who are the true culprits in this sad saga? Where does the responsibility really reside? The naïve RAF Officers who fell hook line and sinker for the BPA smoke-and-mirrors act? They certainly have a lot to answer for, but will the MOD roll over and take the rap for the death of Sgt Fisk?
Surely the HSE must have been aware of the BPA evasion of Health and Safety laws, or did the CAA aid and abet the BPA in misleading the HSE? The HSE could have stepped in and dealt with the BPA, shutting down all the criminal activity many years ago and thus saved a multitude of lives in the process.
The HSE have certainly been remiss in fulfilling their regulatory duties over several decades and have failed to produce a Code of Practice or to endorse a suitable sector code.
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| CAA CEO Richard Moriarty: corporate manslaughter? |
There is a glimmer of hope from the Department for Transport with the recent announcement from Secretary of State Grant Shapps MP that an independent appeals body will be established to deal with complaints against the CAA. But the question remains does this go far enough?
BPA Watch will leave it for the readership to decide: who are the real lawbreakers who should subsequently be prosecuted for corporate manslaughter:
- Tony Butler, COO and ghost director of the BPA?
- Richard Moriarty, CEO of the CAA?
- Both of the above?
The website run by BPA Ltd trading as British Skydiving contains the following shocking claim, which BPA Watch intends to investigate:
"Attempts by the Health and Safety Executive to exercise control over parachute equipment standards and to investigate skydiving incidents and accidents; a move which finally resulted in negotiating a memorandum of understanding whereby the HSE relinquished their position and acknowledged the expertise of British Skydiving (then BPA) and the CAA in matters of skydiving regulation.".
If this is true, then HSE chiefs seem illegally to have assigned HSE duties and powers to a limited company whose officials consistently refuse to present any government-approved or awarded credentials or qualifications entitling them to hold and wield such powers. Consequently, the death toll continues to rise and Sgt Rachel Fisk will not be the last name on that lengthening list.
