HSE EXEMPTS BPA FROM H&S LAW?

BPA exempted from the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974?

Are HSE Memoranda of Understanding a legal paradox or simple stupidity?

By Bravo Three Zero CMIOSH

Editorial Foreword

In the third and final part of our series on the Rachel Fisk tragedy, we addressed many of the underlying failures that any investigation should consider. However, we did not explore the question of the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) that the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) has drawn up with the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and British Parachute Association Ltd trading as British Skydiving (BPA/BS).

As readers of this blog know, BPA Watch (BPAW) has questioned the legality of the CAA’s delegation of parachuting regulatory oversight to BPA/BS and not just because the CAA, as a quango rather than a Aviation Ministry, has no right to create other quangos as in this case, in effect, of BPA/BS. A study of the Law reveals that the CAA is not the parachuting Enforcing Authority and has delegated to BPA/BS regulatory powers that were not in the CAA’s gift to begin with. The HSE is the true parachuting Enforcing Authority. 

However, anyone who interpreted the HSE’s imposition upon the Royal Air Force (RAF) of a Crown Improvement Notice over the skydiving-related death of RAF Sgt Fisk as an indication that the HSE was finally assuming its legal obligations might be in for a rude disappointment. A reading of the various Memoranda of Understanding drawn up between the HSE and various parties suggests that the Crown Improvement Notice imposed on the RAF is not worth the paper upon which it is printed.

CAP1484 CAA/HSE/HSENI Memorandum of Understanding guidance

 

Readers wishing to familiarise themselves with the HSE’s MOU processes should begin by taking a look at the CAP 1484 CAA/HSE/HSENI Memorandum of Understandingguidance page on the CAA’s website. This document supports the CAA/HSE/HSENI MOU and explains in greater detail the enforcement responsibilities of each regulator and the interfaces between the organisations.

Sport parachuting - Liaison between HSE inspectors and the civil aviation authority (CAA)

OC 801/2 Supplement 1

MOD parachuting

This Supplement to OC 801/2 outlines the approach which should be adopted in relation to parachuting undertaken by MOD. The arrangements are different from those detailed in OC 801/2.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND THE HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE

This Memorandum of Understanding –– known as the ‘General Agreement’ –– records an agreement between the MOD and the HSE in discharging their respective roles and responsibilities for regulation and enforcement of health and safety (H&S) legislation on the MOD estate and for MOD activities in Great Britain (GB).

To uninformed observers, these MOUs seem to represent a logical approach to parachuting regulation and seem to make reasonable legal argument in that MOD sports parachuting should be undertaken in accordance with the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and Regulations made thereunder.

Consequently, the issuing to the RAF by HM Inspector Emma Page of a HSE Improvement Notice for  Crown Employees on October 7^th 2021 makes complete sense. 

 

However, the MOD’s Joint Services Adventurous Training (JSAT) sports parachuting centres are required to affiliate to BPA/BS. This affiliation obliges the JSAT centres to operate in accordance with the BPA-BS Operations Manual. Thus the MOD has agreed to these contractual terms and paid BPA/BS the requisite fees in confirmation of this formal agreement.

As BPA Watch previously highlighted, Group Captain Mark Smith, Commandant of the RAF Robson Academy of Resilience at RAF Weston-on-the-Green, also confirmed this MOD-BPA/BS contract when he wrote: “RAF Weston on the Green, JSAT sports parachuting centre - operates under the auspices of British Skydiving - the National Governing Body (NGB) - who externally assure our parachuting activity.”.

Observers could be excused for wondering why the BPA/BA was not jointly named on HM Inspector Emma Page’s Crown Improvement Notice and why the Notice was addressed to Group Captain Smith’s deputy Wing Commander Tim Page –– who should engage good lawyers if he has not already done so. As BPAW’s Don Canard remarked of Page, he is being “done up like a kipper.”.

Wing Commander Page’s best defence might well consist of a legal argument that the HSE Crown Improvement Notice has no standing in Law because the contract between the MOD and BPA/BS is highly likely to negate the HSE-MOD MOU and any jurisdiction claimed by the HSE in relation to Sgt Fisk’s death.

As BPA Watch has previously reported, no BPA/BS officials seem able to produce any credible, government-issued, recognised or approved credentials qualifying them for any role in Health and Safety, accident prevention and investigation. The question must be asked: who were the HSE officials who approved the HSE-BPA/BS MOU without carrying out the prerequisite and necessary due diligence?

As one leading Parachute Training Organisation owner asked: “was the HSE acting to counter a proposal from within the CAA to deregulate skydiving, which would have confirmed the HSE as the regulator?”. Given that the HSE is actually the parachuting regulator, the question is moot but as long as the HSE continues to deny its obligations under the Law, the question remains an issue, especially with the rising toll of skydiving fatalities and life-changing injuries.

And then there is the HSE-BPA/BS MOU as described by BPA/BS Communications Manager Angel Fernandez in a news bulletin entitled ‘Why BritishSkydiving is so important to us all?’. 

Obviously, previous attempts by the HSE to exercise control over parachute equipment standards and to investigate skydiving incidents and accidents seem to have led to this HSE-BPA/BS MOU exempting BPA/BS from the health and safety law.

Through this MOU, if Fernandez was writing factually, the HSE apparently negated its legal obligations and duties to protect people at work in MOD and civil parachuting enterprises, and disregard to public safety, handing control over to the CAA - BPA/BS cartel.

In his article on May 9^th 2020, Fernandez discusses the HSE-BPA/BS MOU and makes some quite extraordinary and worrying assertions. Fernandez describes a litany of BPA/BS evasion and resistance to legal compliance and safety improvements proposed by various regulators and authorities.

As BPA Watch has already reported, the CAA-BPA document CAP 660 is not compliant with Health and Safety legislation. Fernandez also attempts to give the impression to readers that BPA/BS is the equivalent of HM Government departments and agencies, stating that the firm carries out regulatory functions and is in practice the Regulator.

Fernandez uses similar language to that later deployed by BPA/BS Chief Operating Officer –– and ghost CEO –– Tony Butler when he describes the HSE as a “threat”. More recently, in a written riposte to the lawsuit brought against BPA/BS by the majority of its affiliated Parachute Training Organisations, Butler described the HSE as a “danger”. Fernandez explains these ‘threats’ to readers:

• Attempts by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to exercise control over parachute equipment standards and to investigate skydiving incidents and accidents; a move which finally resulted in negotiating a memorandum of understanding whereby the HSE relinquished their position and acknowledged the expertise of British Skydiving (then BPA) and the CAA in matters of skydiving regulation.
• Successful opposition to a subsequent proposal from within the CAA to deregulate skydiving, which would have effectively handed regulation over to the HSE.

In correspondence with HM Inspector Emma Page –– the HSE case officer assigned to the Sgt Fisk investigation ––  and HM Principal Inspector Stephen Faulkner, BPA Watch asked, essentially, if the HSE-BPA/BS MOU amounted to the HSE granting the BPA an exemption from the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and HSE jurisdiction.

In response to this and other questions, Mr Faulkner wrote; “The Notice does not represent the conclusion of the investigation, it was served on the RAF in relation to the management of sport parachuting activities undertaken by its employees as part of adventure training.  There are many lines of enquiry which are being undertaken but I am unable to comment on these at this stage.  Please be reassured that we have registered the concerns you have raised”.

The MOD Air Secretariat stated to BPA Watch on October 27^th 2021: “While I note the concerns and questions you have raised, I hope you will understand that a joint investigation is currently underway being conducted by Thames Valley Police and the Health & Safety Executive (HSE). As such, it would be inappropriate to comment until these investigations are complete.

“I can confirm that the Defence Safety Authority has convened a Service Inquiry (SI) to determine the cause of the accident, together with any other contributory or aggravating factors. It may be helpful if I explain that, on completion, the SI panel’s report will be provided to the HSE and the Coroner, and the report will be published on the Gov.uk website.”.

 

Both the HSE and the MOD seem not to understand that the MOD-BPA/BS contract, namely the JSAT affiliation to BPA-BS, has primacy in Law and nullifies the HSE-MOD MOU, thus enabling the HSE-BPA/BS MOU to take legal precedence.

If BPA/BS Communications Manager Angel Fernandez is correct in writing publicly that the “HSE relinquished their position and acknowledged the expertise of British Skydiving (then BPA) and the CAA in matters of skydiving regulation”, it means in effect that BPA Ltd trading as British Skydiving has been granted an exemption from The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and, consequently, HSE jurisdiction. 

Since the 1996 CAA-BPA Exposition, renewed in 2020, BPA/BS is the Regulator for all matters pertaining to parachuting and skydiving and can act as they see fit regardless of statutory provisions.

Aided and abetted by the HSE, the CAA and the MOD, this amateur sports association –– operating as an illegal commercial monopoly –– has been able to circumvent constitutional law and Parliament in order to give the BPA/BS Operations Manual quasi legal status , even though the MOD havepreviously questioned the adequacy of the document.

The HSE have deemed BPA/BS as ‘experts’ on all matters relating to parachuting and skydiving, a blessing which includes all such activities undertaken by the MOD.

The BPA has codified in CAP660 that MOD parachuting qualifications and expertise including those of professional RAF Parachute Jump Instructors (PJI) and Army parachutists are not recognised and that only unaccredited BPA/BS awards are acceptable. 

The firm is aided and abetted in this by the CAA, whose directors have consistently declined to agree that recognised qualifications issued under the Regulated Qualifications Framework by accredited Awarding Bodies are valid.

Despite the warnings of this blog and others to HM Government Ministers, the Police, HSE and MOD Service Inquiry investigators now appear to be sleepwalking into a legal minefield that may take a judicial or parliamentary review to resolve.

Sgt Rachel Fisk: victim of negligence

The MOD seems to have subjugated itself and the expertise of its service personnel –– like the late Sgt Fisk –– along with NVQ and other recognised qualifications to an amateur sports body run by people who pay themselves six-figure annual salaries whilst spending no more than £5,000 a year on safety-related matters.

The HSE seems to have signed away its powers  and, with those powers, the rights of military and civil parachutists to the protection that is their right under The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and related regulations.

If this is so, then whatever findings the HSE and the MOD present to the Coroner, who must rule on the Rachel Fisk fatality, can be deemed as questionable in Law and, more to the point, challenged by the charlatans of British Parachute Association Ltd trading as British Skydiving should the Coroner’s findings not be convenient to BPA/BS.

All the Coroner has to do is ask the HSE to produce its parachuting Code of Practice, a document it cannot produce as no such Code exists. Will the Coroner ask any of the parties involved in the investigation to produce their credentials?

The MOD is the only such party that can field credible parachuting experts but as we have seen, the MOD seems to think the charlatans of BPA/BS more qualified than their own parachuting experts.

We will conclude with a simple question and some food for thought:

Since when has the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, the protection of persons at work and public safety, together with HSE oversight, ever been considered as a “danger” or a “threat” in the context of the UK regulatory framework?  The answer is obvious: since the introduction of the CAA-BPA Exposition in 1996, which CAA directors claim “reflects Government policy”.

Despite decades of illegal if not downright criminal activity – systematic evasion of health and safety law – the current legal situation would strongly suggest that BPA/BS enjoys the equivalent of Crown Immunity, an immunity reflected in the HSE omission of BPA/BS from the Crown Improvement Notice imposed on the RAF in relation to Sgt Fisk’s death.

The RAF –– JSAT, the Robson Academy of Resilience, RAF Weston-on-the-Green, 2 Group and 22 Group –- and their appointed scapegoat Wing Commander Tim Page should be able to see the HSE off by citing the agreements upon which the BPA Watch team stumbled whilst reporting on the Sgt Fisk affair.

Charlatans: BPA.BS 'interim report' into the death of Sgt Fisk

It seems that none the guilty parties can be prosecuted under The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 because of the HSE exemptions that their employers enjoy. Perhaps Thames Valley Police will try to bring charges of corporate manslaughter but would the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) approve such charges?

However, as BPA/BS are the controlling mind and the personnel at RAF WOTG are contractually bound to operate under the auspices of BPA/BS and in accordance with the BPA/BS Operations Manual, Thames Valley Police and the CPS would probably need to bring the charges against BPA/BS and its directorate under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 – not the MOD.

BPA Watch now challenges HM Government and its various Enforcing Authorities to do the right thing by reinstituting the rule of law in the UK so that Sgt Rachel Fisk’s bereaved family can obtain some kind of justice relating to their daughter’s entirely avoidable death in the service of her nation. 

Rachel Fisk was at work and died because of the negligence of those controlling and overseeing her activities – BPA/BS officials, cited by the CAA as “world class” and representing the “gold standard” in parachuting.

 

 

 

RACHEL FISK: LICENCE TO KILL

Is the CAA-BPA Exposition a 'licence to kill'? The British Parachute Association now trading as British Skydiving deliberately evades Health and Safety Executive scrutiny and regulation whilst presiding over a shocking annual death and injury toll.

The CAA permits its mini-me skydiving and parachuting regulator to get away with this lethal lawbreaking and so do the CAA quango's masters at the Department for Transport. Worse yet is that the HSE itself condones it while skydivers continue dying through refusing to assume its legal role and duty as the regulator. 

RAF Sergeant Rachel Fisk is merely the latest skydiver to die. The HSE has at least issued an Improvement Notice (see below) proving that Sgt Fisk was killed by what amounts to corporate negligence. However, the HSE has once again allowed BPA/BS to slither away unpunished, back into the netherworld over which its ghost supremo Tony Butler rules.

The HSE has hung it on the RAF. Better than that from the viewpoint of RAF 22 Group commander Air Vice Marshall Richard Maddison, the HSE seems to have hung it on a relatively junior-ranking staff officer. Stitching up the RAF was a first for the BPA/BS, which generally sets its sights lower when searching for scapegoats f deaths and life-changing injuries on its watch; the firm usually targets its own affiliated parachute centre operators or any BPA-rated instructor dispatching skydivers or running ground operations.

Does the undue influence of the BPA also extend beyond the capture and compromise of the Department for Transport through its uncontrolled quango the CAA to the capture and compromise of the Ministry of Defence – the answer seems to be a resounding 'yes'. 

When it suits BPA/BS, they play to the peanut gallery as a benevolent amateur sports association but let's not lose sight of the facts that the firm has a minimum annual turnover of £1.7 million – which may be double that figure if its alleged insurance-related machinations are taken into account – and pays its senor officials six-figure annual salaries yet spends no more than £5k a year on safety-related matters.

The least one can say of the CAA-BPA cartel is that the BPA gets a lot from the CAA in return for the £30k annual fee the firm pays to the quango's General Aviation division. Not only can BPA/BS evade all kinds of laws under CAA patronage, the CAA actively aids and abets the maintenance of an illegal BPA/BS commercial monopoly by obstructing and preventing the entry of other UK parachuting associations to the marketplace. BPA Watch has amply reported on all of this.

The 5th Edition of the BPA-CAA document CAP 660 was described by some critics as opening the way for BPA/BS to exert undue control over military skydiving and parachuting. These fears were ridiculed by some senior military officers but the death of Sgt Fisk and the way in which BPA/BS was clearly able to drive the investigation raises questions, not least of which is how BPA/BS came to be so influential in the death of a serving military NCO during military-run adventure training on MOD property, namely RAF Weston-on-the-Green.

According to BPA insiders and victims of BPA bullying, the BPA forces Parachute Training Organisation operators to declare that employees and contractors are not 'at work' in order to evade HSE interference and they get away with this because the HSE allows them to do so. However, Rachel Fisk and her colleagues were at work.

All skydiving equipment provided to instructors for work purposes or otherwise available for hire is, as a minimum, subject to the requirements of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulation, the Working at Height Regulations 2005, Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992 and the Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998. To this regard, who is reasonable for fulfilling relevant duties under these regulations?

It is an established fact that Sgt Fisk was at work, therefore incumbent obligations are applicable. Many of the real experts and professionals are stating that the ‘burble theory’ purported by the unqualified amateurs at the BPA is totally incorrect and aimed at diverting attention away from the fact that it was an equipment functionality failure that resulted in Sgt Fisk’s reserve not deploying.

CAP 660 states that skydivers "must only use equipment acceptable to British Skydiving" which clearly indicates that the BPA are responsible for control over equipment standards – little wonder they are pushing the ‘burble theory’ as any equipment failure makes the BPA culpable under numbers-related regulations.

The Law stipulates that the CAA must authorise skydivers and parachutists to exit an aircraft in flight. The CAA can only withhold its authorisation – Parachuting or Special Parachuting Permissions – if it can show just cause. The Air Navigation Order 2016 (amended) is clear: the CAA must issue such permissions.

The CAA itself quotes from Article 23 of the ANO, addressing exceptions from the provisions of the Order. This is an important article, because it exempts small unmanned aircraft (as well as small balloons, small kites and parachutes) from the majority of the ANO’s provisions, and it then specifies those articles which still apply.

The legislation is clear: the CAA is the regulator whilst skydivers are on the aircraft and must give permission for the skydivers to exit the aircraft [at altitude] under Article 90 of the Air Navigation Order 2016 (amended) (ANO).

Once the skydiver has exited and cleared the aircraft in accordance with Article 23 of the ANO, the ANO is not applicable nor is the CAA any longer the regulator – matters revert to overarching legislation, in particular the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999.

The HSE is in reality parachuting's Enforcing Authority.

This is confirmed in CAA publication CAP1484 CAA/HSE/HSENIMemorandum of Understanding guidance. The document supports the CAA/HSE/HSENI MOU and explains in greater detail the enforcement responsibilities of each regulator and the interfaces between the organisations.

It is highly arguable that CAA publication CAP660 deliberately omits Article 23 and CAP1484, and the matters to which they pertain, thus facilitating evasion of the Law as the CAA and its illegally-appointed mini-me quango BPA/BS see fit. 

Regarding ANO Article 90, Mike Bravo CMIOSH told BPA Watch:

“The Air Navigation Order 2016 (ANO) like most UK legislation is not prescriptive; it is goal-setting in nature, with the objective of driving advancement in performance standards and best practice, continuous improvement and the development of compliance criteria.

"Subsequently, there are no instructions for the duty holder to follow in the ANO regarding parachuting. Article 90 simply requires that the particular parachute organisation or team are in possession of a permission and/or exemption issued by the CAA in order to exit an aircraft in flight and consequently adhere to the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and regulations made thereunder.”.

However, the CAA quango lays down a smokescreen of obfuscation. The CAA has no transparently articulated application or assessment processes, in contradiction of the principals upon which UK law is based and in direct opposition to government directives relating to deregulation. There is no appropriate appeals process in place or otherwise independent oversight. There is no ombudsman.
All parachute dropping carried out from civil registeredaircraft over the UK is regulated by the CAA and must be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Air Navigation Order.

CAP 660 Parachuting is a comprehensive-looking source of information containing rules, regulations and guidance on:

• Legal requirements
• Parachuting operations
• Parachuting displays
• Monitoring and audit
• Safety management systems and risk assessment
• Relevant legislation
  

Not only does the CAA seem to be taking a £30,000 annual bribe from its delegated regulator, the quango's directorate seems also to take a cue from the BPA in terms of propaganda, misdirection and lying with an element of truth.

Many parts of CAP 660 are a direct cut-and-paste insertion from the legally dubious and rigid rule-based BPA Operations Manual – the only operations manual accepted by the CAA, which joins with BPA/BS in touting it as "the gold standard". 

CAP 660 is, however, only advisory. It has no legal standing and is not signed off by the Secretary of State. As such, it is not the equivalent of, for instance, a HSE-Approved Code of Practice.
The content does not provide any kind of regulatory framework or articulate any assessment criteria or evaluation process.

The CAA cannot enforce the provisions of this highly questionable document because they would need to refer back to the ANO – which clearly establishes that their jurisdiction ceases once the skydiver has exited and cleared the aircraft.

However, it is well-documented that the CAA believe that they can make up any rules and policies that suit them and act as prosecutor, judge and jury if anyone dares to object or formally complain.

CAA corporate culture is far from ‘just’ and is in most cases opaque. The overall attitude of the authority seems to be ‘we are the CAA, we refuse to engage with you and if you don’t accept that, then we shall revoke your licence, permissions or certificates’.

Bravo Three Zero CMIOSH told BPA Watch: “CAP 660 is poorly constructed and amateurish in nature, the content is quite extraodinary and one can only draw two reasonable conclusions; either the authors or, more importantly, those who approved CAP 660 [the CAA legal counsel] were totally incompetent and have little knowledge and understanding of the law. [BPAW established that CAA Legal Counsel lied about CAP 660 – Editor] or it was a deliberate attempt to evade the law.

"CAP 660 is in breach of numerous Statutory Instruments (Acts of Parliament and Regulations) or made a conscious and deliberate decision –– i.e. collusion and connivance –– to breach and/or evade a host of legal requirements, onus obligations and incumbent duties, thereby committing criminal offences.

"From the substantive available evidence, the latter is the most likely scenario, which is extremely worrisome, as this would have required the collusion and collaboration in extensive law braking and malfeasance of an Authority, albeit one that is mendacious and constantly found to be disrepute i.e. the CAA.”.

Mike Bravo CMIOSH said: "CAA duplicity is clearly evident: the CAA does not recognise Health and Safety legislation and HSE jurisdiction nor does the CAA accept current best practice because the BPA pays the CAA £30,000 per annum for their Approval of Persons status and to furnish reports to the CAA.

"To put this simply, the BPA tell the CAA what they can and cannot do as a regulator, including telling them to act illegally, protect the BPA monopoly and cover up criminal activities – and the CAA agree – and further publicly state that this is Government policy.

"Mainstream business shifted away from rigid rule based operational manuals to a risk management approach more commonly referred to as Safety Management Systems more than two decades ago.

"This was supported by the publication of various recognised management systems; HSE publication HS(G)65 Managing for Health and Safety, British Standards Institute and International Standards Organisation standards such as BS 8800 – HS(G)65, BS EN ISO 9001, BS 8800 – 14001, OHSAS 18001 and more recently BS EN ISO 45001.

"None of these internationally recognised standards is acknowledged or adopted by the BPA and so, therefore, they are also rejected by the CAA. The CAA or rogue directors of the CAA are up to their necks in lawbreaking.

"These standards require evidence-based and demonstrable compliance with health and safety law, and are independently assessed and assured by accredited and recognised Awarding and Certifying Bodies under UK Accrediting Certification (UKAC) scheme – which the BPA do not deem appropriate as they do not conform to the BPA's much-vaunted operations manual.

"This manual is held up as "world class" and "the gold standard" by the CAA and other BPA partners like the RAF and people are – falsely – warned that a breach of the BPA or BS Operations Manual is a breach of the law.

"And when Joe Public is told this by people who seem to have the law behind them, he knuckles under, doesn't he? Especially if he thinks his BPA ratings are going to be taken from him. He doesn't even know those ratings are worthless in any legal sense!".

A current BPA Vice-President recently described the BPA as follows: “The BPA is an insignificant amateur sports body that has been ‘bigging’ themselves up for years, yet they still operate like a small club working out of the backroom of a pub in the 1960s”

The CAA denies that CAP 660 gives the CAA and BPA/BS regulatory control over military parachuting activity or operations.

The management of Health and Safety in Defence – Ministry of Defence – is established in Joint Services Publication (JSP) 375. This collection of documents is the corporate publication that provides guidance to defence in meeting its legal health and safety obligations.

It provides a common structure for the organisation and arrangements for the day to day management of health and safety within defence. JSP 375 provides the direction that must be followed in accordance with Statute, or Policy mandated by defence or on defence by central government and the guidance and best practice that will assist the user to comply.

MOD establishments such as the Robson Academy – responsible for RAF Weston on the Green, Joint Services Adventure Training (JSAT) sports parachute operations – should also conduct activities in accordance with JSP822 which provides defence direction and guidance for training and education. It is the system that must be used by those who are involved in the analysis, design, delivery, assurance, management and governance of Defence training and education.

2.1 Introduction to Defence Systems Approach to Training (DSAT)1. Service Inquiries and injury reporting are an ever-present reminder of the importance of safety at the heart of Defence activity and Training is no exception. Increasing scrutiny and drive for continuous improvement demands that safety does not solely apply to perceived ‘high risk’ physical activity and will be a golden thread throughout this policy. Commanders have a duty of care to trainees and their families not only in terms of Care and Welfare (C&W) but also in Health and Safety (H&S) with respect to the delivery of training capability. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that training is delivered and managed safely by suitable qualified and experienced personnel (SQEP), through the conduct of dynamic risk assessments and rigorous assurance activity.

JSP822 further establishes the intention to maintain a strategic and coherent approach across defence, in relation to full national qualifications and accreditation schemes under the [civilian] Regulated Qualifications Framework overseen by Ofqual. The document provides comprehensive guidance, to duty holders, to ensuring a close fit with external academic and skills development – national vocational qualifications (NVQ).

Regulatory Article 2355 - Static Line and Freefall Parachuting Guidance Material 2355(2) Procedures for Static Line and Free Fall Parachuting

13. Sport Parachuting can be conducted for military purposes, eg: engagement events such as air shows.

14. Where Sport Parachuting has been approved by the ADH or AM(MF) the National Governing Body procedures detailed in the British Skydiving Operations Manual may provide some guidance for orders and procedures. However, the procedures set out in the Tac AT manuals and HQ 2 Gp Operations Manuals for equivalent military parachute systems provide sound guidance on how the activity may be conducted which the ADH or AM(MF) may wish to consult prior to promulgating Sport Parachuting procedures.

This and other MOD documentation require the application of a significant administrative process that would need to be systematically worked through in order to demonstrate that activities such as skydiving are safe and legislatively compliant. This would include, as a minimum:

• Compliance with Health and Safety Executive codes of practice or otherwise possession of relevant endorsements
• Evidence of certification to the appropriate quality (9001) and/or safe management (18001 or 45001) standard
• Training accreditation in accordance with the Regulated Qualifications Framework
• Confirmation of Insurances policies
• Formal nomination of responsible person(s)
• Safety plans and risk assessments
• Assessment and benchmarking process against MOD regulations and standards, in this particular instance 2 Group – Parachute Operations Manual (POM)

Given the inherent risk to life involved in skydiving, it is would behoove the MOD to apply the correct level of diligence to understanding the level of safety, legislative and regulatory compliance in relation to such operations, the associated criteria, procedures and processes under which activities were conducted, utilising relevant subject matter expertise and advice from other competent agencies, as necessary.

In this regard, the MOD recently stated:

“When military personnel are conducting adventure training or sports parachuting through civilian bodies whether in the UK or overseas, this is conducted under the regulations and operating procedures of those civilian bodies. However, military Aviation Duty Holders will retain duty of care responsibility for those military personnel. Consequently, there are well established processes as part of that duty of care responsibility for military aviation duty holders, to identify any difference in regulatory, safety management or operating standards for those civilian bodies and assess any risks as part of the military safety management system. This will enable the military to mitigate any duty of care risks from differences in standards, where this is appropriate”.

This may, on the surface, appear to be a reasonable statement from the MOD, but to the trained eye it is totally ridiculous. In simple terms this statement really means:

"We accept the unaccredited and poor level of training standards together with the legally non-compliant and highly questionable operational manual of an amateur sports organisation even though we know significant risks to life exist. We have our comprehensive and robust systems, processes and procedure in place i.e. the 2 Group POM, that we chosen not to implement; instead we decided to mitigate the risk by – allegedly – retrospectively applying our safety management systems, in an attempt to turn a pig’s ear into a silk purse – or in other words we accepted exceeding low and legally non compliant BPA standards and still failed to achieve them.".

However, HSE document OC 801/2 Supplement 1 MOD parachuting articulates matters as follows:

1. As a general rule parachuting undertaken by service personnel and parachuting by civilian members of MOD sponsored parachuting clubs is not subject to the day-to-day control and regulation of the British Parachuting Association (BPA).

To contradict and confuse matters further, BPA/BS does not accept any recognised parachute and instructor qualifications awarded under the Regulated Qualifications Framework, including those awarded by the MOD as a recognised Awarding Body, nor do does BPA/BS recognise military jumps and numbers of military jumps carried out.

MOD JSAT sports parachuting centres are required to affiliate to BPA/BS and consequently are contractually obliged to operate in accordance with the BPA Operations Manual. This is also confirmed in an email – confidentially provided to BPA watch – written by RAF Group Captain Martin Smith, Commandant of the Robson Academy of Resilience at RAF Weston-on-the-Green:

“RAF Weston on the Green, JSAT sports parachuting centre - operates under the auspices of British Skydiving - the National Governing Body (NGB) - who externally assure our parachuting activity.".

It is also understood that BPA representatives audited – obviously extremely poorly – RAF WOTG's JSAT sports parachute centre, a BPA Affiliated Parachute Training Organisation (PTO), in July 2021 and presumably provided a ‘clean bill of health’. Surely the HSE ought to have addressed its Improvement Notice to the BPA instead of the RAF?

The question must be asked, how can the unqualified charlatans of the BPA externally assure the compliance and safety of any PTO business operation, and more specifically an MOD establishment, staffed by highly qualified military parachute jump instructors? The death of Sgt Rachel Fisk seems to provide the answer: they can't and the HSE Improvement Notice proves it.


Have the recommendations from the Service Inquiry into the death of a soldier whilst parachuting at Bad Lippspringe, been ignored by RAF WOTG JSAT sports parachute (skydive) centre?
Why were the comprehensive and robust MOD safety requirements not applied by Robson Academy to RAF Weston on the Green (WOTG), JSAT sports parachute (skydiving) operation?
Why was RAF WOTG JSAT not working to the safety standards encapsulated in the 2 Group POM?

This brings us back to our previous question; does the undue influence of the BPA also extend beyond the capture and compromise of the Department for Transport through its uncontrolled quango the CAA to the capture and compromise of the Ministry of Defence – the answer seems to be a resounding 'yes'.

The CAA has approved an amateur sports body to conduct audits for and on behalf of the CAA, yet the BPA does not possess the capability in terms of qualified and competence personal or expert professional support together with the prerequisite suitable and sufficient systems, appropriately robust and accepted procedures to conduct an external audits of any third party and adequately compliance assure, in particular with regards to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and Regulations made thereunder.

The BPA is not a Professional, Statutory or Regulatory Body nor is the BPA an Accrediting or Certifying body, as defined under any relevant Statutory Instrument or recognised framework.

The United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) is the appointed National Accreditation Body for the UK, which means the organisation performs accreditation with the relevant authority derived from HM Government.

Any Certification Bodies who intend to issue accredited certification – i.e. ISO 9001 Quality Management Systems or ISO 45001 Health and Safety Management Systems – must be audited and accredited by an Accreditation Body –i.e. UKAS – against the requirements of the ISO 17021 Standard; accreditation to which the BPA have not at this juncture attained or is ever likely to attain. Furthermore, the BPA’s own management arrangements are not currently certificated under either BS EN ISO 9001 or 45001.

BPA Ltd COO Tony Butler: legal netherworld

The BPA is not a National Awarding Body or otherwise a recognised or accredited training provider under the National Regulated Qualifications Framework overseen by Ofqual.

The BPA cannot therefore issue academic qualifications or national vocational qualifications (NVQ). Any of the attendance badges and proficiency stickers provided by the BPA – an unaccredited and unrecognised amateur sports organisations – do not pertain to any form of recognised qualification and generally have little standing, particularly in the workplace and business environment or otherwise under law. As one BPA instructor recently commented;

“My BPA ratings are absolutely worthless - they didn’t even qualify me get a job stacking shelves at Tesco during the COVID shutdown.”.

Yet the BPA have the audacity to recommend to the CAA that BPA or British Skydiving stickers and badges are the only ‘qualifications’ are acceptable to the CAA but that recognised qualification awarded under the Qualifications Regulated Framework are not acceptable – a perfect example of the broken CAA system.

National Governing Sports Bodies such as the BPA are generally self-appointed; however, some are recognised by the Sports Council and thus form an element of the sport, to which the relevant body organises, governs and administers the sport on a national basis.

Traditionally NGSBs may be viewed as the custodians and guardians of their sport; however, these bodies are not Enforcing Authorities and have no derived Regulatory powers from HM Government. Furthermore, the BPA has no competence to advise businesses on legal matters, in particular Health and Safety Law – that is the responsibility of the HSE.

BPA annual reports and accounts state that BPA consistently spends less than £5,000 per year on safety; little wonder that there have been 50 fatal accidents, hundreds of life changing and thousands of serious injuries over the 25-year period since BPA obtained its contentious and illegal Exposition from the CAA.

This abysmal safety record is extraordinary and the death toll continues unabated, whilst BPA officials line their pockets with six figure salaries and the BPA amasses £4 million in assets and funds.

The death of Sgt Rachel Fisk was eminently avoidable. Such basic and fundamental failures under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety Work Regulations 1999 clearly pave the way for the Crown Prosecution Service to pursue charges of corporate manslaughter via various avenues.

So who are the true culprits in this sad saga? Where does the responsibility really reside? The naïve RAF Officers who fell hook line and sinker for the BPA smoke-and-mirrors act? They certainly have a lot to answer for, but will the MOD roll over and take the rap for the death of Sgt Fisk?

Surely the HSE must have been aware of the BPA evasion of Health and Safety laws, or did the CAA aid and abet the BPA in misleading the HSE? The HSE could have stepped in and dealt with the BPA, shutting down all the criminal activity many years ago and thus saved a multitude of lives in the process.

The HSE have certainly been remiss in fulfilling their regulatory duties over several decades and have failed to produce a Code of Practice or to endorse a suitable sector code.

CAA CEO Richard Moriarty: corporate manslaughter?

There is a glimmer of hope from the Department for Transport with the recent announcement from Secretary of State Grant Shapps MP that an independent appeals body will be established to deal with complaints against the CAA. But the question remains does this go far enough?

BPA Watch will leave it for the readership to decide: who are the real lawbreakers who should subsequently be prosecuted for corporate manslaughter:

• Tony Butler, COO and ghost director of the BPA?
• Richard Moriarty, CEO of the CAA?
• Both of the above? 

The website run by BPA Ltd trading as British Skydiving contains the following shocking claim, which BPA Watch intends to investigate:

"Attempts by the Health and Safety Executive to exercise control over parachute equipment standards and to investigate skydiving incidents and accidents; a move which finally resulted in negotiating a memorandum of understanding whereby the HSE relinquished their position and acknowledged the expertise of British Skydiving (then BPA) and the CAA in matters of skydiving regulation.". 

If this is true, then HSE chiefs seem illegally to have assigned HSE duties and powers to a limited company whose officials consistently refuse to present any government-approved or awarded credentials or qualifications entitling them to hold and wield such powers. Consequently, the death toll continues to rise and Sgt Rachel Fisk will not be the last name on that lengthening list. 

RACHEL FISK: WHITEWASH?

 

RACHEL FISK: WHITEWASH?

By Mike Bravo CMIOSH

Any reputable company or organisation will have in place established suitable and concise procedures and protocols with regards to Major Incident Announcements –– such as fatal accidents. These procedures and protocols will be subject to and compliant with Health and Safety, Corporate Communications and Legal Counsel advice.

The basis for such an approach is obvious; many of the matters relating to a fatal accident are sub judice and, as such, must remain confidential until investigations and enquiries are concluded, because enforcement action including prosecution may be pursuant and there is likely to be insurance claims or litigation for damages and loss.

The object of any official announcement is to inform stakeholders and to provide only the necessary facts to the general public in a clear articulate manner. The two main imperatives are:

• not to cause further distress to the casualty’s already distraught family  
•  not to prejudice or unduly influence enquires and investigations or otherwise adversely impact upon any form of legal process   

In Part 1 of this article, Bravo Three Zero CMIOSH raises these very issues.

• What was the motivation of British Parachuting Associate Ltd (BPA) trading as British Skydiving (BS) for issuing this ‘Interim Report’ regarding Sgt Helen Fisk’s death?
• Has the BS action unduly influenced or otherwise adversely impacted upon the investigation of Sgt Fisk’s death?
• Who gave this amateur sports body and its officials –– who apparently hold no officially awarded, relevant qualifications ––  permission to issue such a poorly constructed and speculative report?
• In so doing, has BPA/BS now rendered the Ministry of Defence (MOD) liable to a lawsuit by Sgt Fisk’s family?
• Has BPA/BS exposed Royal Air Force senior staff officers of 22 Group to prosecution by the Police?

Any information disclosed into the public domain at this juncture, should only be via official sources such as the Police, Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and/or the MOD, probably subsequent to consultation with all stakeholders, prior to Coroners Court hearings. Such information should be limited solely to the established fact that Sgt Fisk’s parachutes did not deploy, as per the various news media reports based upon MOD press office statements.

Sgt Fisk was a serving member of HM Forces, on duty at an MOD establishment or otherwise at work, whose employer was the RAF. The BPA/BS officials who released this interim report had no business doing so and some observers are wondering why this charlatan organisation is even involved to begin with.

It is highly arguable that BPA/BS is not a credible witness in the first instance as its representatives do not meet the recognised criteria of professional experts. Furthermore, BPA/BS does not operate a parachute training organisation and thus has no experience in day-to-day skydiving activities and the running of a business delivering such services.

However, BPA/BS is the Civil Aviation Authority’s delegated parachuting regulator, a status that has demonstrably enabled this amateur sports association to establish a lucrative commercial monopoly over parachuting in the United Kingdom since the Exposition drawn up in 1996 with the CAA. With these vested interests in play, BPA/BS is not an impartial party.

Some critics suggest that in publishing this interim report, BPA/BS intended to prepare the ground for a cover-up relating to Sgt Fisk’s death and extricate themselves from any form of culpability.

Tony Butler: BPA Ghost Director

 Any opinion offered by BPA/BS to the Coroner’s Court should be deemed inadmissible not just because of this strong likelihood of bias but because the BPA/BS officials participating in the investigation have never produced any credible credentials. Indeed, the firm’s Chief Operating Officer Tony Butler’s only experience seems to be his investigation of numerous fatalities – with no tangible improvements in safety as a result. Meanwhile, the death toll simple keeps rising.

None of these investigations has prompted BPA/BS officials –– some of whom receive six-figure salaries –– to raise the firm’s safety-related expenditure from its annual average of £5,000. This well-documented fact alone is enough to undermine BPA/BS’ self-promoting propaganda and its smoke-and-mirrors act.

Many people within the sector pose the questions:

• Does the £30,000 annual fee paid by BPA/BS to the CAA quango for its Approved Person status equate to a sale by the CAA of an illegal commercial monopoly?
• Has the CAA sold BPA/BS exemption from laws like The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and permission for BPA/BS officials to act illegally with no regulatory oversight or sanction?
• Has the CAA quango overreached its powers in transforming BPA/BS into a quango in its own image? BPA Watch has published several articles about BPA/BS –– and CAA –– lawbreaking.

The BPA/BS monopoly is the subject of a lawsuit by a majority of the BPA/BS-affiliated PTOs, who formed the Parachute Training Organisation Association Ltd for just this purpose.

The skydiving sector is forced by the CAA and its delegated regulator BPA/BS to operate in accordance with the BPA/BS Operations Manual, with safety allegedly assured by BPA/BS and ensured by the CAA as the purported parachuting Enforcing Authority. As BPA Watch and other observers have pointed out, the Health and Safety Executive is in reality the parachuting Enforcing Authority.

There is unequivocal evidence that the BPA is the controlling mind within the CAA-BPA cartel and, therefore, the organisation is at the very minimum vicariously liable if not directly culpable for all skydiving accidents. In some instances, this may engage the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. Indeed, BPA Ltd officials have narrowly escaped corporatemanslaughter charges in the past.

Just one example is the series of static line student deaths within a 12-month period in the early 2000s. Four students died after becoming entangled in their parachute equipment (rigging lines), a long-known hazard associated with the type of aircraft exit used at that time.

The Chair of the working group ––an ex-RAF Parachute Jump Instructor (PJI), 2 Group, No. 1 Parachute Training School, RAF Brize Norton –– resigned in disgust at the BPA attitude and its failure to adequately address the specific risk issues.     

Grant Shapps: responsible for CAA-BPA cartel

 

These are important underlying matters that the HSE and MOD investigators –– the Police –– need to focus upon: the systemic management control, system and procedural failures that reside within the construct of the BPA/BS framework and its Operations Manual, touted as a safety gold standard by various parties with vested interests.

One reason why the BPA has not previously been the focus of HSE investigations is because its ghost directors and officials habitually coerce BPA-affiliated Parachute Training Organisations (PTOs) into not reporting accidents under Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 (SI 1471) (RIDDOR).

The coercive tactics applied include threats ­­–– behind closed doors –– of punitive action such as suspending their BPA/BS affiliate status or their instructor ratings. Unfortunately, many BPA-rated instructors believe that these ratings are valid qualifications when, in fact, there is nothing official about them. They are not worth the paper upon which they are printed.

Failure to report accidents under RIDDOR is a criminal offence under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. The BPA/BS modus operandi is clearly in direct contravention of statutory requirements to report parachuting accidents not involving an aircraft under RIDDOR as stipulated by the HSE and the CAA’s own document CAP 1484.

The CAA directorate –– traditionally headed by former high-ranking RAF officers appointed by the Transport Minister –– is equally implicated because of its sanctioning of BPA/BS policy –– the head of the firm is on written record as describing the HSE as “a danger” to its operations –– so is the Minister responsible for the CAA quango also of the belief that the HSE is a danger?

In cases like Sgt Fisk’s death at RAF Weston-on-the-Green on September 2^nd 2021, the MOD is required to report parachuting accidents to the HSE in compliance with OC 801/2 Supplement 1. This raises the following questions:

• Is the CAA acting outside its authority and in breach of constitutional law by exempting the BPA from overarching legislation?
• Has the CAA deliberately misled the HSE and HM Government Ministers in pretending to be the parachuting regulator?
• Why has the HSE failed to produce a Code of Practice for Parachuting?
• When will the HSE realise what has been occurring over a 25 year period and take back its regulatory oversight function from the CAA quango?

Detailed investigations into the true root causes of accident events has never been a primary motivation for BPA/BS. BPA-rated instructors appointed as lead investors have often been threatened when their reported findings did not align with BPA/BS intentions, which usually involve blaming any Chief Instructor in charge of the drop zone for contravening the rules rather than questioning and testing those rules to ensure that they were correctly formulated in the first place.

BPA/BS rules tend to be formulated and adopted in a reactive rather than proactive manner. In other words, the firm locks the stable door after the horse has bolted or, as one BPA/BS Advanced Instructor put it:

 “The BPA Operations Manual has developed over a long period of time on an ad hoc basis and needs to be completely rewritten.”. 

The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 introduced the concept of reducing risk “so far as is reasonably practicable”. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations, which came into force in 1992, builds upon this concept with the requirement to carry out a “suitable and sufficient risk assessment” with the aim of developing “adequate control measures” - prompting businesses to adopt a Safety Management Systems approach during the 1990s.

However, BPA/BS has not kept pace with the rest of the world, sticking defiantly with their inflexible approach as encapsulated in their Operations Manual. This defiance is facilitated by the failure of the CAA to challenge its –– illegally –– delegated regulatory overseer, a failure shared by, at the time of writing, Transport Minister Grant Shapps and by the HSE.

The BPA/BS Operations Manual is touted as the “gold standard” and “the only operations manual accepted by the CAA", assertions that go unchallenged because the CAA refuses, in effect, to process other organisations’ safety management documentation as part of its facilitation of the BPA/BS commercial monopoly over skydiving and parachuting.

BPA/BS pay the CAA £30,000 per annum for its Approved Person status, an exorbitant fee by any governmental or even quango standards. In return, the CAA ensures that the illegality of the CAA-BPA CAP 660 document is not exposed by any properly-composed and Heath and Safety-compliant parachuting CAPs presented by other organisations that would reveal, for instance, CAP660’s non-compliance with Health and Safety law and regulation.

This blog is not alone in raising concern, as one instructor examiner and former BPA director stated on social media: “The BPA Operations Manual is not based upon a robust risk management approach and is not fit for purpose.”.

Active Monitoring – inspection and audit, and Reactive Monitoring – accident and incident investigation form integral parts of the Measuring and Reviewing Performance elements of any recognised Safety Management System, and thus provides particular drivers as part of the overall continuous improvement process.

HSE publication HSG245 Investigating Accidents and Incidents establishes the minimum requirements and provides guidance on the systematic approach that should be adopted in determine why an accident or incident has occurred and the steps needed to ensure it does not happen again.

However, BPA COO Tony Butler views any HSE involvement inskydiving as a “danger” and prefers to attribute any accident to a single cause; in Sgt Fisk’s case, the BPA/BS cites the burble. Typically with most BPA/BS accident reports, the intention is to attribute blame in terms of a technical failure or human error – the smokescreen to obscure the complexity of accident causation.

This serves to conceal the fundamental contributors to the event from investigatory overseers and the general public by creating the impression that the accident causes are beyond the scope of management control or, in other words, the BPA/BS directorate and the firm’s Operations Manual.

The ‘technical failure’ finding thus lays the blame on an inanimate item of hardware and on human error –– the rule-breaking Chief Instructor or the reckless skydiver at the scene of the accident. This approach serves to conceal the fact that such accidents are the result of management failures in the areas of organisation, procedure and risk control.

As BPA Watch has previously noted, senior BPA/BS official like Tony Butler receive reported six-figure salaries –– and generous expenses allowances –– whilst the firm’s annual safety-related expenditure hovers around £5,000.

When Mr Butler was BPA Ltd’s National Safety Officer, he spoke to a coroner’s court –– and to the press –– of investigating more than sixty skydiving fatalities. That was in 2003 during the confusion over BPA member Stephen Hilder, whose death was initally treated as murder. The death toll has remained constant since then, Rachel Fisk merely being the latest, which indicates that BPA/BS has done nothing to improve its appalling safety record. Mr Butler is currently the firm’s COO and named Person with Significant Control, and generally regarded as a ghost Director and Chief Executive Officer.

The categorisations of accident underlying and root cause factors, based on risk control principles, include but are not limited to the following;

• Safety management failures
• Human factors
• Technical failures

As an integral part of the overall enquiries, investigators will normally want to review and analyse previous accident data and statistics in order to identify any patterns or trends. However, the BPA has never reported accidents to the HSE nor categorised any accidents in accordance with RIDDOR criteria.

Consequently, the data available to other investigators –– in this case, the MOD, the RAF, the HSE and Thames Valley Police –– is incomplete and unreliable and thus inhibits the undertaking of any meaningful analysis.

Investigators will also want to review reports and findings relating to previous, similar accidents to establish any links or patterns in terms of root causes and underlying risk control failures. However, as this blog has clearly established, any report emanating from BPA/BS is highly likely to be unreliable.

The only adequate investigation into a skydiving fatality to be found in the public domain is the Service Inquiry into the death of a solider whilst parachuting at Bad Lippspringe, Germany – Document: 1 Rifles parachuting accident 29 September 2015.

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/service-inquiry-into-the-death-of-a-soldier-whilst-parachuting-at-bad-lippspringe-germany-on-29-september-2015

It would appear that none of the significant findings and recommendations within this report have been addressed, implemented or otherwise adhered to by BPA/BS and, in this case, the RAF organisations in partnership with BPA/BS, which include The RAF Robson Academy of Resilience.

This is because BPA/BS is an arrogant, corrupt, insular, self-serving mini-me quango –– created illegally by the CAA quango in its own image –– whose directors consider themselves above any laws, a belief underscored by CAA protection and, we must not forget, the patronage of no less a figure than HRH The Prince of Wales. 

Of course, this Royal patronage was granted when the British Parachute Association was a bona fide amateur sports association staffed and run by retired military officers, before the likes of Tony Butler and his cronies took it over.

As for the senior RAF staff officers from 22 Group who oversee the RAF partnership with BPA/BS, BPA Watch has seen evidence that they were warned about BPA/BS and its dangerous practices earlier this year but they seem to be just as arrogant and careless as their civilian partners. And why not? They are all covered by the CAA, which is chaired by retired RAF officers.

Jobs for the boys: CAA Chair Sir Stephen Hillier

Sgt Rachel Fisk’s death was eminently avoidable but BPA Watch doubts that their consciences will be troubled. And putting its seal of approval on this toxic fellowship is the CAA quango, headed by retired RAF bigwigs like Air Chief Marshall Sir Stephen Hillier. And supporting the CAA quango is Transport Minister Grant Shapps. 

BPA/BS subterfuge and misdirection –– the art of lying with an element of truth as in the ‘burble’ axiom purported by the BPA Board of Inquiry – once again clouds the issue through this ‘interim report’.

Several parachute riggers have commented that, the javelin skyhook combination is notoriously difficult to pack; at most, the burble merely exacerbated an equipment functionality failure or packing mistake or otherwise is the equipment simply not fit for purpose? 

As video footage shows, there was a clear 3-second delay between Sgt Fisk’s activation of her reserve parachute and the camera shot of her drogue deploying; what happened during these three seconds?

Commenting to BPA Watch on condition of anonymity –– for obvious reasons –- a well-respected skydiving instructor and examiner stated: “The BPA should not have issued this report before the coroners court hearing. I can only hope that the family of Sgt Fisk finds a team of experts to legally challenge what appears to be an attempted whitewash. Not for the first time when it comes to the BPA.”.   

A long-serving former BPA Director or more than 25 years’ standing told us: “There should be a lot of very nervous members of the BPA Council at this time, as they will be held culpable for all the illegal actions of the BPA over many years. This accident is different. It is a serving member of the RAF that has died and the HSE are involved.

The BPA have been evading HSE scrutiny and regulation for years and got away with until now. Hopefully justice will eventually prevail and the HSE will see through the smokescreen with this accident and prosecute the BPA.”.

The question now being asked across the sector in both civilian and military circles is: does the BPA/BS and CAA rhetoric about BPA/BS being the “gold standard”, “world class” and “safest in the world” constitute misrepresentation in legal terms and is there an intent to mislead external authorities and the general public, including its customers, with regard to inherent and inadequately controlled risks relating to the sport of skydiving?

It is an important question for the 60,000-plus members of the public who participate in tandem skydiving each year and who are at risk. Of course, BPA/BS would say that an average of two or three deaths a year is low but the fact is that many of those deaths could have been avoided, just like Sgt Rachel Fisk’s death if the CAA-BPA/BS cartel took skydiving safety seriously.

This blog has asked the question before: how many people need to die before the authorities take heed of the situation and adequate interventions and action are forthcoming?

Secretary of State for Transport Grant Shapps MP should be taking a closer look at the CAA quango, its usurpation from the HSE of regulatory control, its delegation of those stolen powers to an amateur sporting association run by unqualified charlatans and the shocking death and injury toll over which the CAA-BPA cartel has presided since 1996.